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WHEN PHYSICIANS BALK AT FUTILE CARE:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS LAWS
Philip G. Peters, Jr.*
Physicians and medical ethicists are currently engaged in a con-
tentious debate over the obligation to offer "futile" care. As a conse-
quence, a new class of disputes about the withholding of life-
sustaining care is emerging. In this debate, providers are balking at
family demands for life-sustaining care that they believe is medically
inappropriate. This Article explores the limits that the disability
rights laws place on these bedside decisions.
In some respects, the recent "futility" controversies surrounding
Baby K,1 Helga Wanglie,2 Ryan Nguyen,3 and others4 are just the
* Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. J.D., University of
California at Berkeley, 1976; B.A., Harvard University, 1972. I am grateful for the comments of
Mary Crossley, Mark Hall, Haavi Morreim, and David Orentlicher. Research for this article was
partially funded by the John K. Hulston Research Fellowship in Health Law and the Shook,
Hardy and Bacon Faculty Scholars Research Fund.
1 In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. CL 91 (1994).
2 In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369
(1991). Providers proposed to unplug the respirator and pull the feeding tubes from a non-
terminally ill comatose patient over her husband's objections. The providers unsuccessfully
sought a judicial determination that the patient's husband was not a competent decisionmaker,
rather than raising the futility issue directly.
3 See Alexander M. Capron, Baby Ryan and Virtual Futility, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1995, at 20. According to this account, two hospitals refused to continue to provide dialysis
for a premature newborn with brain damage, an intestinal blockage, and kidney malfunction
because "long-term dialysis would not only be inappropriate but also would be immoral" be-
cause it would prolong the boy's agony with "no likelihood of a good outcome." The family
obtained a court order for further treatment and eventually located a facility that would willingly
provide Ryan with treatment. His condition then improved after intestinal surgery. The first
hospital had contended that the family's request for aggressive care constituted child abuse.
4 For example, in 1992, a court in the United Kingdom ruled that a London hospital could
withhold life support from a severely brain-damaged eighteen-month-old child on the ground
that it had "too few resources to treat all the patients whom they would like to treat." Re J [A
Minor][Medical Treatment], CA. (10 June 1992), quoted in Ross Kessel, British Judges Cannot
Order Doctors to Treat, HAST]NGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1992, at 3. A Georgia trial court
refused the request of several doctors to withdraw life support from a teenager in a condition
"between a stupor and a coma." In re Doe, C.A. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1991), reprinted in
7 ISSuEs L. & MED. 521, 531 (1992), affd, 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (1992). A Texas court reportedly
upheld a doctor's withdrawal of hemodialysis on the grounds of medical futility. See Mark A.
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most recent stage of a long history of litigation over the circumstances
in which life-sustaining treatment can be stopped-litigation in which
concerns about improper discrimination against frail, elderly, or dis-
abled patients have always been prominent. But in two crucially im-
portant senses, the current generation of cases is quite different.
First, the families and physicians have reversed their roles. In the
early right to die cases like those of Karen QuinlanS and Nancy
Cruzan,6 patients or their families were resisting unwanted life-sus-
taining care. In the current generation of cases, by contrast, families
are requesting care and physicians are resisting it. For purposes of the
antidiscrimination laws, the difference is fundamental. Family deci-
sions are not governed by the federal disability rights laws, but physi-
cian and hospital decisions often are. As a result, the substantive
implications of the disability rights laws for bedside treatment deci-
sions must now be unraveled.
A second distinctive feature of the current generation of bedside
treatment cases is their underlying cost-consciousness. Surely, it is not
coincidental that these disputes are arising at the same time that pri-
vate and public benefits plans are tightening their cost controls and
health policy analysts debate how much health care the nation can
afford. The disability rights issues raised by these resource allocation
decisions are novel and have not yet been considered by the courts.
The possibility of improper discrimination arises whenever a pa-
tient's disability plays a role in a physician's determination that life-
sustaining care would be inappropriate. Yet, treating physicians will
often feel that a patient's disability is relevant. At times, the disability
itself may give rise to the need for treatment. At other times, it can
reduce the likelihood that treatment for unrelated conditions will be
effective. In both categories of cases, the patient's illness may so im-
pair the patient's quality of life that her treating physicians conclude
that life-extending care would be cruel, pointless, or wasteful. Taking
disability into account in any of these ways can potentially violate the
disability rights laws. But the deepest objections to taking disability
into account arise when physicians act on their beliefs about a dis-
abled patient's quality of life. For that reason, this Article uses qual-
ity-of-life considerations as the vehicle for examining the application
Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 693, 710 n.56 (1994) (citing
Duensing v. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., No. SA-87-CA-1119 (W.D. Tex. Dee. 22, 1988)
(granting defendant summary judgment)). For other examples, see infra text accompanying
notes 26-33. Obviously, most unilateral decisions by providers to cut back on care are not liti-
gated. See Hall, supra, at 723-24 (describing the medical literature acknowledging cessation of
CPR efforts from debilitated patients and from severely ill newborns).
5 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
6 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 261 (1990).
91.798 (197)
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of the antidiscrimination laws to bedside disputes about life-sustaining
care.
The courts have suggested two conflicting paradigms for analyz-
ing medical treatment decisions under the disability rights laws. Each
has serious shortcomings. One unwisely insulates from challenge all
treatment decisions that arise out of the patient's disability, no matter
how patent the prejudice. The other corrects that mistake, but inap-
propriately prohibits providers from taking a patient's disability into
account under any circumstances. As a result, each approach is too
blunt-one too restrictive and the other too permissive. In addition,
neither of these approaches considers the unique issues raised when a
treatment decision is based on resource allocation considerations,
rather than on patient welfare.
A preferable approach to the futility cases would have three key
components. First, the antidiscrimination laws would be applied to all
bedside treatment decisions, even those which arise out of the pa-
tient's disability. Invidious discrimination can occur as readily when
patients are denied treatment for a disfavored disability as when they
request treatment for unrelated conditions. The administrative and
conceptual concerns that have motivated courts to distinguish be-
tween related and unrelated care are not insignificant, but they are
not insoluble either.
Second, physicians who believe that a requested treatment would
result in an unacceptable quality of life should ordinarily defer to the
preferences of their patients. When the patient's wishes are unknown,
however, health care providers should be permitted to take disability-
impaired quality of life into account when they genuinely and reason-
ably believe that treatment requested by a surrogate would be cruel.
Under these circumstances, courts should permit physicians to opt out
of the requested care as long as they cooperate with the transfer of the
patient to a physician who shares the family's values. This compro-
mise respects the consciences of physicians while preserving ultimate
decision-making authority for patients and their families.
Third, when physicians balk at life-sustaining care because it
seems a poor use of scarce health care resources, courts should closely
examine the authority of the physician to make resource allocation
decisions. In addition, the disability rights laws should prohibit con-
sideration of disability-impaired quality of life except in the most ex-
treme cases, that is, when doubts about the value of treatment are
most serious and the costs are substantial.
Part I of this Article reviews the factual background of the futility
debate. Part II introduces the antidiscrimination laws. Thereafter,
Parts III, IV, and V examine the three components of the proposal
suggested above.
800
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Futility Debate
The futility debate began as a reaction to the widespread use of
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). After studies revealed that
some groups of CPR patients, especially the elderly, rarely survived to
discharge from the hospital,7 physicians began to question the propri-
ety of routinely administering CPR to patients who were very unlikely
to survive it.8 Physicians questioned not only their obligation to offer
treatment under these circumstances, but also their duty to discuss the
decision with the patient.9 Soon, physicians were asking the same
questions about other treatments that were unlikely to succeed or
whose anticipated benefits were less than the expected burdens.' 0
Physicians are deeply divided over these questions. According to
one review of the medical literature, most physicians believe that they
are under no obligation to render care that they perceive to be futile."
However, many others believe that these decisions involve value judg-
ments that should be made by patients, not physicians.' 2
7 See, e.g., Susanna E. Bedell et al., Survival After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the
Hospital, 309 NEw ENo. J. MED. 569 (1983); William A. Gray et al., Unsuccessful Emergency
Resuscitation-Are Continued Efforts in the Emergency Department Justified?, 325 NEw ENG. J.
MEm. 1393 (1991); Arnold L. Johnson et al., Results of Cardiac Resuscitation in 552 Patients, 20
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 831 (1967); George E. Taffet et al., In-Hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscita-
tion, 260 JAMA 2069 (1988).
8 See e.g., Donald J. Murphy, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Time for Reappraisal in Long-
term-Care Institutions, 260 JAMA 2098 (1988); Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brady, Futility and the
Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276 (1990). For an extended review of the futility debate,
see TOM L BEAucRA e & JAMSs F. CHi REss, PRINcipLEs oF BIoMEDicAL ETics 212-14
(4th ed. 1994); Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish. Resuscitating Self-Determination, 35 Aiz L
REv. 23 (1993); Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IowA L.
REv. 179, 182-202 (1995); Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physi-
cian's Professional Conscience, 44 HASINGS LJ. 1241, 1248-59 (1993).
9 See, e.g., J. Chris Hackler & F. Charles Miller, Family Consent Orders Not to Resuscitate:
Reconsidering Hospital Policy, 264 JAMA 1281 (1990); Murphy, supra note 8; Lawrence J.
Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 949 (1990).
10 See, eg., Schneiderman, supra note 9; supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
11 Daar, supra note 8, at 1256-57 (citing Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317
NEw ENo. J. MED. 1281, 1284 (1987) (arguing that when CPR is of no benefit, it should not be
offered to patients)); Donald J. Murphy & David B. Matchar, Life-Sustaining Therapy: A Model
for Appropriate Use, 264 JAMA 2103 (1990) (arguing that medically or economically inappropri-
ate treatments should not be automatically offered); Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 949 (arguing
that treatments that do not improve the person as a whole are futile and may be withheld by
physicians); Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1278-79 (1990) (arguing that physicians should be able to restrict alternatives of-
fered to patients for sake of physician integrity and patient autonomy); see Murphy, supra note
8; Paris, infra note 33.
12 See, e-g., John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED.
81, 83 (1989); D.B. Waisel & R.D. Truog, The Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation-Not-Indicated Or-
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In the course of this wide-ranging medical discussion about the
circumstances in which physicians can withhold requested treatments,
physicians have used the term "futility" to mean many different
things. Medical ethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress offer a
helpful list of treatments that have been labeled as futile: (1) treat-
ments providing no physiological benefit, (2) treatments highly un-
likely to be efficacious, (3) treatments offering a poor probable
outcome, (4) treatments likely to be more burdensome than benefi-
cial, and (5) unproven treatments.' 3 They could easily have added a
sixth category comprised of treatments that will not provide sufficient
benefit to the patient to justify the allocation of resources.' 4
Predictably, the least controversial of these categories involves
treatments which simply do not produce the physiological effect de-
sired by the patient.15 No one suggests that a patient can insist that
her physician attempt to cure her stomach cancer with interferon,
which has no effect on stomach cancer. 6 But other usages of the futil-
ity label are much more controversial. Consider, for example, the
medical studies about CPR which assume that resuscitation which
rarely results in survival to discharge is futile.' 7 This superficially "sci-
entific" judgment masks subjective assumptions about the value of
short-term survival. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, "short-
term survival may be the main objective for the patient or the fam-
ily."'18 Some patients may desire very much to live until a grandchild's
birthday or to see another sunrise.19 Placing a value on short-term
survival, therefore, requires more than a "medical" judgment.20
Similar value judgments are necessary in order to determine
whether treatments with a very small likelihood of success are worth-
while.21 Determining the desirability of these treatments requires
consideration not only of the odds of success, but also of the quality of
life that will be offered, and the burdens imposed by the treatment.
der. Futility Revisited, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 304 (1995); Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines
Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094 (1988).
13 BEAUCHAMP & CmLDREss, supra note 8, at 212-13.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 225-30.
15 See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CmLDREss, supra note 8, at 212 (characterizing these treatments
as optional); Daar, supra note 8, at 1255 ("If a treatment will not produce a benefit sought by the
patient, it can be considered futile."). The AMA believes that treatments may be considered
futile if they would not achieve the goals expressed by the informed patient AMA COUNCIL ON
ETmrcAL AND JUDICIAL AroAias, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Or-
ders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1870 (1991).
16 Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility, 20 LAW MED. & HALTHi CARE 310 (1992).
17 BEAUCHAMP & CmtIaDRss, supra note 8, at 289 (describing this viewpoint); Gray, supra
note 7.
18 BEAUcRAMp & CILDREss, supra note 8, at 289-90.
19 See Daar, supra note 8, at 1254; Youngner, supra note 12, at 2095.
20 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDR.Ess, supra note 8, at 213.
21 Id. at 289.
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Although the quantitative aspect of futility judgments based on low
success rates gives them an air of medical objectivity, this facade
masks very subjective value judgments.
The subjectivity of futility judgments is especially obvious when
physicians conclude that the patient's quality of life makes further life-
extending care inappropriate. Consider the case of Helga Wanglie, a
Minnesota woman who was in her eighties.22 Following a cardi-
opulmonary arrest, Mrs. Wanglie suffered oxygen deprivation and was
diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state. After she had
spent several months on a respirator receiving tube feeding, her physi-
cians felt that continued treatment was "inappropriate" and that it
was "no longer serving the patient's personal medical interest."2 3 Her
husband Oliver strongly disagreed. Describing himself and his wife as
"pro-lifers," he reportedly remarked that "only God can take life and
... doctors should not play God."24 The hospital attempted to have
Mr. Wanglie removed as guardian, and a Minnesota probate court re-
fused this request.25 Although the case was legally framed as a dis-
pute over Mr. Wanglie's decision-making competency, the central
issue of this case was the disagreement between Mrs. Wanglie's hus-
band and her doctors about the value of life with a severe disability.
B. Bedside Conflicts
In the past few years, providers have become increasingly resis-
tant to family requests for care which they perceive to be inappropri-
ate. Although Helga Wanglie's case is the most famous conflict
between physicians and families, it is just one of many bedside dis-
putes reported in the legal and medical literature. In Washington,
D.C., for example, Dr. Murray Pollock went to court once and to a
hospital ethics committee another time, trying to stop life-sustaining
treatments for two newborns, one suffering from severe brain damage
and the other dying of AIDS and heart disease.26 According to a
newspaper report about the second child, Baby Rena, "[w]hen nurses
22 A useful summary of her case appears in the Appendix of BEuCHAMP & Cmmrnnss,
supra note 8, at 517. The probate court opinion is reprinted in 7 IssuEs L & MED. 369 (1991).
Further information can be found in Alexander M. Capron, In re Helga Wanglie, HAsnz.os
CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 26; Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HAST os
CmNTm REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 23; and, Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Benefi-
cial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. Mm . 512 (1991).
23 Cranford, supra note 22, at 23.
24 Id.
25 After many conferences attempting to resolve this dispute, a physician at the medical
center unsuccessfully attempted to have a conservator appointed for Mrs. Wanglie. Capron,
supra note 22, at 26. The probate judge concluded that Mr. Wanglie was in the best position to
protect his wife's preferences. In re Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 369, 372 (1991).
26 Benjamin Weiser, A Question of Letting Go: Child's Trauma Drives Doctors to Reexamine
Ethical Role, WAsH. Posr, July 14, 1991, at Al.
91.798 (1997)
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performed even the simplest procedure, such as weighing her, her
blood pressure shot up and tears streamed down her face."27 She was
constantly sedated for pain. Believing that artificial ventilation for
Baby Rena was "making the child suffer,"28 Pollock tried to convince
the family to discontinue aggressive care.
The case of Baby Terry was similar. He was born prematurely at
twenty-three weeks gestation.29 Because of respiratory distress, he
was put on a respirator. He also had bacterial and fungal infections,
insufficient oxygen supply to the brain, bleeding on the brain, and a
stomach fistula. His physicians predicted that "he wouldn't live a
day" and recommended that artificial respiration be discontinued.
Baby Terry was receiving pain medications for his discomfort, but his
physicians apparently believed that his quality of life was too poor to
warrant further life-extending care.30 When Terry was one month old,
the Genesee County Department of Social Services sought a judicial
order of child neglect because Terry's parents insisted on aggressive
care. The probate judge decided instead to treat the case as a chal-
lenge to the competency of Terry's custodial parent, ruling that his
mother had "specific incompetence" to choose Baby Terry's medical
treatment.3 1 Baby Terry's aunt was appointed guardian and report-
edly consented to reduction of his oxygen supply from 100% to 20%.
Baby Terry died in his mother's arms.
There are many other examples. Jane Doe was a thirteen-year-
old girl with a severe, degenerative neurological disorder whose physi-
cians felt that life-sustaining efforts were "so painful as to be abu-
sive."32 Baby L was a blind, deaf, and quadriplegic two-year-old girl
receiving nutrition through a gastrostomy tube. She had the mental
status of a three-month-old and had daily seizures. At one time, she
had required ventilator support and her physicians believed that re-
instituting that support, should it become necessary, would be
"inhunane" 33
27 Id. She eventually died, but aggressive care was not withheld.
28 Id
29 Baby Terry's litigation is described in James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse
by Whom?-Parental Rights and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby
Terry Cases, 20 Omo N.U. L. Rayv. 821, 825-27 (1994).
30 Id. at 827, 835.
31 The Genesee Circuit affirmed the probate court ruling and denied a stay pending further
appeal. Id. at 826-27.
32 Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Court Bars Efforts to End Life Support for Stricken Girl, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10. The hospital went to court seeking permission to cease aggressive
care. Her mother did not object, but her father did. The court left the decision in the hands of
the parents. Id.; In re Doe, C.A. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED.
521 (1992), affd, 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (1992).
33 John . Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322
NEw ENG. J. Mar,. 1012 (1990). Her physicians unsuccessfully urged her parents not to place
her on a respirator in the event that she experienced breathing difficulties. The mother refused
HeinOnline  -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  804 1996-1997
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The frequency with which disputes like these are being reported
suggests that far more of them are occurring quietly in hospitals
around the country.
C. The Disability Rights Issues
The possibility of improper discrimination arises whenever a pa-
tient's disability plays a role in the physician's determination that life-
sustaining care would be inappropriate. That can occur often. Most
obviously, a physician who is treating the disability itself must take
that disability into account. Providers can hardly be expected to ig-
nore a patient's AIDS when planning a course of treatment to delay
its progress.34 At other times, a disability, such as cancer, may reduce
the efficacy of customary treatments for unrelated conditions, such as
heart disease. For example, patients with severe diabetes or pulmo-
nary disease have traditionally been considered poor candidates for
coronary bypass surgery.35 In addition, a disability may make a cus-
tomary treatment more dangerous.3 6 Yet, taking disability into ac-
count under any of these circumstances could, on the right set of facts,
potentially violate the antidiscrimination laws.
The disability rights issues are most controversial when providers
base an end-of-life treatment decision on their belief that a severely
disabled patient has a poor quality of life.37 When a severely disabled
patient, like Helga Wanglie, is denied a life-saving or life-prolonging
treatment that would be offered to other patients, the value of her life
has effectively been discounted because of her disability. The more
severely disabled the patient, the more likely that life-extending care
to consent and sought judicial protection. A pediatric neurologist retained by the guardian ad
litem to evaluate the baby's condition agreed to assume the baby's care. Baby L's expenses,
which were in excess of one million dollars, were covered by insurance.
34 They may, however, be asked to ignore the patient's quality of life when making decisions
about life-sustaining care. See infra text accompanying notes 143-57.
35 See, e.g., David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting,
268 JAMA 1454, 1457-58 (1992) (noting poorer outcomes commonly associated with de facto
disabilities such as severe diabetes or cancer); David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 271 JAMA 308, 310 (1994) (noting that patients with pulmonary disease are
poor candidates for coronary bypass surgery).
36 Mary Crossley gives the example of an HIV-infected child with an unrelated perforated
eardrum. Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: Discriminatory Nontreatment of
Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1581, 1650 (1993). Because of this child's HIV
status, she is more likely than other children to become infected if corrective surgery is per-
formed on her eardrum. As a result, she may be better off with an alternative treatment.
37 It is less controversial to examine quantitative factors than to assess a disabled person's
quality of life because quantitative factors do not suggest that a disabled person's life is less
valuable. As suggested in the text, however, their use can still potentially violate the disability
rights laws. For a brief discussion of the issues in connection with decisions about the patient's
best interests, see infra notes 140-41. For a brief introduction to the issues raised when quantita-
tive factors are used to determine whether requested care is cost-effective, see infra note 238 and
text accompanying notes 234-40.
91:798 (1997)
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requested by family members will be characterized by providers as
cruel, pointless, or wasteful. Consequently, Robert Griss, the director
of the Center on Disability and Health in Washington, D.C., contends
that any decision not to treat based on patient quality of life violates
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 (ADA).38 James Bopp,
Jr. and Daniel Avila, counsel for the National Legal Center for the
Disabled and Dependent, have reached the same conclusion.39
To rule on this issue, the courts will have to resolve a conflict
between two quite different philosophies. On one side are individuals,
like Mr. Wanglie and Robert Griss, who believe that all life is worth
living and that physicians who disagree are impermissibly discriminat-
ing on the basis of disability. On the other side are the physicians,
ethicists, and state courts supervising termination of treatment cases
who have concluded that quality of life is relevant and that it may be
taken into account when deciding whether life-sustaining care is
appropriate.
The stakes are substantial. A ruling that the antidiscrimination
laws preclude any consideration of disability-impaired quality of life
could restrict not only physicians and hospitals, but also other actors
governed by the antidiscrimination laws, such as state courts, court-
appointed guardians, and social service agencies!n0 All would be
obliged to ignore the patient's quality of life, even if no family mem-
ber were available to make the treatment decision, and even if the
family's wishes appeared to be contrary to the patient's interests.
Similarly, legislatures might be barred from taking disability-related
quality of life into account when drafting advance directive legislation
or standards for courts and guardians. This would work a substantial
change in the substantive law of surrogate decision making. For some
disability rights advocates, that is the objective.41
In addition, a prohibition on quality-of-life judgments would have
crucial implications for health resource allocation and cost contain-
ment. Hospitals and insurers would be banned from taking quality of
life into account when determining which life-extending treatments to
fund. Heroic care, like dialysis and heart transplants, would have to
be offered to anencephalic babies, severely demented adults, and veg-
38 Jane Bryant Quinn, Taking Back Their Health Care, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 36.
39 James Bopp, Jr., & Daniel Avila, When Worlds Collide: Disability Rights and Medical Pre-
rogatives in Matters of Life and Death, 7 HEC FORUM 132 (1995); accord Bopp & Coleson, supra
note 29, at 835-37.
40 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 29, at 843 (stating that courts and guardians exercising
power conferred by state courts or statutes are restricted); see also Bopp & Avila, supra note 39,
at 146-47 (same); Crossley, supra note 36, at 1600-01 (noting that, as a practical matter, medical
decisions for many children born with HIV infection are made by agents of the state). For a
further discussion of these implications, see infra text accompanying notes 176-83.
41 See Bopp & Avila, supra note 39, at 146-47.
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etative teenagers without regard to the quality of life that they are
likely to enjoy as a result.
II. THE FEDERAL DisABirrY RGIrrs LAws
A. The Basic Statutory Framework
Two federal statutes protect disabled individuals from improper
discrimination. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Sec-
tion 504") bars disability-based discrimination by any program receiv-
ing federal financial assistance.42 The more recent ADA43 extends
this prohibition against disability-based discrimination to employers,
state and local governments, and public accommodations, including
doctors' offices and hospitals.44
Because the federal antidiscrimination laws define "disability"
broadly to include any impairment "which substantially limits a major
life activity,"45 almost every serious health pioblem will qualify as a
disability. Blindness, mental retardation, emotional illness, cancer,
heart disease, and HIV infection are a few of the examples listed in
the federal regulations. 46 As David Orentlicher notes, this definition
is so broad that it is unlikely to be a serious hurdle for lawsuits over
bedside rationing decisions,47 especially those involving critically ill
patients.48
Although the specific terms of Section 504, the ADA, and their
respective regulations are not identical in every respect,49 the basic
application of both statutes to medical treatment decisions that take
42 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, provides as
follows: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... "
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
44 Id. §§ 12112, 12131, 12181(7), 12182; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995) (establishing that public
accommodations include the professional office of a health care provider, hospital or other simi-
lar service establishment); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 55-56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 544-45. Public accommodations must also "affect commerce." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7). Furthermore, in some situations individual providers may not qualify as public ac-
commodations. See Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
failure to provide interpreter for patient's spouse did not give rise to action against physician
who did not have any measure of control over the hospital providing the services).
45 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
46 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995).
47 Orentlicher, supra note 35, at 309.
48 See Crossley, supra note 8, at 212-13 (noting that it is nearly impossible that someone who
is denied life-sustaining treatment would not also qualify as "disabled").
49 Section 504 is short and uses very general language. The regulations implementing it pro-
vide more detailed guidance. By contrast, the ADA is far more detailed than Section 504. The
ADA has separate titles governing employment, government agencies, and public accommoda-
tions. Each has its own substantive prohibitions and, in some instances, each uses different ter-
minology. In addition, each title has its own implementing regulations.
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disability into account is the same.5 0 Both statutes prohibit improper
discrimination on the basis of disability.51 Under Section 504, such
discrimination is only improper if an excluded person is "qualified" to
receive the services he desires despite his disabilities.5 2 Title II of the
ADA, which governs public services, including state or local hospitals
and clinics, has a similar "qualifications" requirement.5 3 Under both
statutory provisions, a disabled person is "qualified" to receive serv-
ices, and therefore is protected against disability-based discrimination,
if he meets all "essential" or "necessary" eligibility requirements for
50 Treatment decisions that do not expressly take disability into account, but which have a
disproportionate impact on disabled persons (such as a limit on the length of insured hospital
stays) are also prohibited under some circumstances by the antidiscrimination laws. However,
the legal test governing these cases may be different under Section 504 than under the ADA.
The Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that Section 504 applies not only to
facially disparate treatment but also to facially neutral conduct that has a disproportionate im-
pact on disabled patients (such as a limit on insured hospital stays). Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287,292-302 (1985); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1995). The ADA appears to govern both kinds of
discrimination explicitly. For example, Title III of the ADA prohibits the imposition of "eligibil-
ity criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of
individuals with disabilities.... unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provi-
sion of the... services. ... " 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(a)(i) (1994) (emphasis added). But the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has vacillated on the issue. Compare EQUAL EMPLoy-
MENT OPPoRTUNrrY COMM'N, INTRmm GumANCE ON DsAmLrIY-BAsED DISTNCnoNs IN
HEALTH CARE PLANs (June 6, 1993), reprinted in 2 Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) 11
140022 n.1, 140024 n.7 (assuming that the disparate impact theory is unavailable under the ADA
or Section 504) with Facility Health Management, Health Law Focus (CCH) 2, at 2-3 (Dec. 21,
1993) (reporting that the EEOC's director of ADA policy had indicated that the agency might
change its position). The application of the antidiscrimination laws to facially neutral conduct is
a fascinating and complex topic that justifies separate and extended discussion. For purposes of
this Article, I have assumed that quality-of-life judgments based on a patient's disability consti-
tute facially discriminatory conduct. As a result, the analysis explored in the text of this Article
applies to instances of disparate treatment but not necessarily to cases involving disparate im-
pact. It would only apply to disparate impact cases if courts choose to apply the same test to
these cases that they apply to disparate treatment cases. While the ADA text quoted above
suggests that the same test may apply to disparate treatment and disparate impact cases which
arise under the ADA, the Supreme Court has enunciated a distinct "meaningful access" test
which applies to disparate impact cases which arise under Section 504. Alexander, 469 U.S. at
292-302. It has neither explored the full implications of this test nor determined whether this test
applies in cases arising under the ADA. For an insightful analysis of meaningful access test as
applied in the context of health care rationing, see David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability:
Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L L.
Rnv. 49, 79-86 (1996).
51 Although Section 504 and each title of the ADA prohibit discrimination based on disabil-
ity, the operative language varies. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (barring discrimination in public
services "by reason of" disability); id. § 12182(a) (barring discrimination in public accommoda-
tion "on the basis of disability"); id. § 12112(a) (barring discrimination in employment "because
of the disability"); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (barring discrimination "by reason of" disability).
52 Section 504 prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified" persons. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a).
53 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (protecting "qualified" persons with disabilities).
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the receipt of these services despite his disability. 54 Thus, an appli-
cant's disability may be taken into account if it affects his
qualifications.
Public accommodations, including private hospitals and physi-
cians' offices, are governed by Title Ill of the ADA. On its surface,
Title HI lacks a "qualifications" requirement similar to those con-
tained in Title II and Section 504.55 Yet, Title III actually achieves the
same result by permitting the exclusion of disabled persons who can-
not meet "necessary" eligibility criteria.5 6 Consequently, both the
ADA and Section 504 protect only those disabled persons who are
able to meet a program's "essential" or "necessary" eligibility require-
ments despite their disabilities.
By permitting disability to be taken into account when it affects a
person's qualifications,5 7 Congress has acknowledged that the pres-
ence of a disability will sometimes be a legitimate consideration. 58
This basic structure is quite different from civil rights legislation gov-
erning race, which assumes that race is irrelevant.5 9 The qualifications
54 Although Section 504 itself does not state when a person is "otherwise qualified" to re-
ceive services, the HHS regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act define the term to
mean "a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
such services .... " 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1995) (applying Section 504 to services other than
employment or education). Under Title II of the ADA, which regulates government services, a
person who is "qualified" to receive public services is someone who "meets the essential eligibil-
ity requirements" for receipt of the services "with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). The Justice Department regulations imple-
menting Title II define essential eligibility requirements to be those "necessary for the provision
of the service." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1995). In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an applicant's disability need not be ignored
when deciding whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements for the service.
55 See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff"d, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (stating that the ADA, in contrast to the Rehabilitation Act,
"does not require that a handicapped individual be 'otherwise qualified"').
56 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(a) (1994).
57 See eg., Davis, 442 U.S. at 405; United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding that consideration of disability is only improper when it "is unrelated to, and
thus improper to consideration of, the services in question").
58 See also U.S. COMM'N ON CvIm RIGHTs, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVID-
uAL ABanrrms 144 (1983) ("The goal is neither to exaggerate and stereotype nor to ignore hand-
icapped people's functional limitations.").
59 See Davis, 442 U.S. 397; Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981); U.S.
Comm'N ON Civm RiGTS, supra note 58, at 143; see also NATIONAL CoUscn. ON THE HANDi-
CAPPED, TowARD INDEPENDENcE app. A-37, A-38 (1986). The basic structure of the law gov-
erning disability rights is more like the treatment of gender, national origin, and religion. With
respect to those classifications, employers are permitted to make a showing that discriminatory
criteria are in fact bona fide occupational qualifications necessary to the business. NATIONAL
COuNCaL ON ma HANDICAPED, supra at app. A-37, A-38. When the civil rights laws were
extended to disabled persons, it was widely recognized that the presumption of irrelevancy
would also be inappropriate here. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 405; U.S. ComM'N ON CrvIL RiGHrs,
supra at 143-44; NATIONAL CouNcri. ON Tm HANDIc xPn, supra at app. A-37, A-38.
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requirement is tempered materially, however, by the requirement that
each program make "reasonable modifications" to its policies and
practices in order to help disabled applicants qualify for the requested
services.60 As a result of this reasonable accommodation requirement,
the disability rights laws confer something more than a bare right to
equal access.61 The reasonable accommodation requirement does not,
however, require a "fundamental alteration" of the program itself.62
To summarize these statutory provisions, a disabled person is en-
titled to receive a desired service such as medical care if, with reason-
able accommodations, she is able to meet all "essential" or
"necessary" eligibility criteria. If she is so qualified, she may not be
denied those benefits or services on the basis of her disability.63
However, her disabilities may be taken into account when determin-
ing whether or not she is qualified.
B. The Judicial History
1. Family Decisions To Withhold Life-Sustaining Care.-Critics
have long feared that the lives of disabled persons would be jeopard-
60 Section 504 itself has no such requirement, but the HI-S regulations implementing it ex-
pressly require reasonable accommodations by employers and educators. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12(a) (1995) (regulating employment); id. § 84.44 (1995) (regulating accommodation in edu-
cation). See also Davis, 442 U.S. at 407-13 (interpreting the education regulations). The ADA
imposes a reasonable accommodation requirement as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)
(1994) (imposing a duty upon private entities providing public accommodations to make "rea-
sonable modifications" to policies, practices, and procedures); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (1995) (re-
quiring public accommodations to make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices or
procedures").
61 See Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAWv
MED. & HEALTH CARE 331,336 (1990) (describing the ADA as an entitlement program placed
on the private sector); Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We
Know a "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 837, 862 (1991) (describing the
ADA as "social welfare legislation," and not simply an "antidiscrimination" law).
62 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (stating that public accom-
modations must make "reasonable modifications in policies, practice or procedures ... unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the ... service"); Davis, 442 U.S. at 410; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1994) (excluding
from the reasonable accommodation requirement for public services any changes that would
"fundamentally alter the nature of the service").
63 Whether a disabled applicant is "qualified" and whether that applicant has been discrimi-
nated against "on the basis of" a disability are two superficially distinct requirements that typi-
cally collapse into a single inquiry. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Alexander v. Choate,
"the question of who is 'otherwise qualified' and what constitutes improper 'discrimination' ...
[are] two sides of a single coin." 469 U.S. 287,299 n.19 (1985) (discussing the Court's interpreta-
tion of Section 504 in Davis, 442 U.S. 397); see also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPD,
supra note 59, at app. A-19, A-20 (the organization that initially proposed the Americans with
Disabilities Act suggesting that the two requirements are redundant and unnecessarily confus-
ing). A disabled person who lacks legitimate qualifications has not been impermissibly discrimi-
nated against. A disabled person who has them may not be treated unfavorably.
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ized if decisions about their medical care could be based on their per-
ceived quality of life. These concerns initially surfaced when families,
rather than physicians, asked that life-sustaining care be discontinued.
As the state law governing the withholding of life-sustaining care
evolved, opponents of quality-of-life judgments asked state courts to
use their common-law powers to bar families from taking disability or
disability-impaired quality of life into account when making decisions
to discontinue life-sustaining care. Most state courts refused this re-
quest, opting instead to allow surrogates to consider the quality of life
that patients would enjoy if provided with life-sustaining care. 64
In response, opponents of quality-of-life decisions invoked the
antidiscrimination protections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974. The
first of these cases arose in Bloomington, Indiana in April 1982, after
parents of a child born with Down's Syndrome would not consent to a
life-saving surgery that would have corrected a blocked esophagus. 65
The Indiana state courts refused to intervene, and the baby died six
days later. In response to this case, the federal government made a
major effort to police parental treatment decisions using its purported
powers under Section 504.66 These efforts were defeated in a series of
lawsuits culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association.67 In a plurality opinion, the Court
held that family decisions to withhold treatment fell outside the reach
of Section 504 and that federal regulations enacted to force hospital
surveillance of these parental decisions were invalid.
As the Bowen case worked its way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Congress enacted the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.68 That leg-
islation requires states receiving federal child abuse assistance to treat
parental failure to obtain medically indicated life-sustaining care as
child abuse. That statute, along with the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowen, temporarily put the issue to rest.
2. Physician Resistance to Requested Care.-In the futility dis-
putes arising now, physicians and hospitals, rather than families, are
resisting treatment. Under the antidiscrimination laws, the difference
is crucial. Health care providers, unlike patients and their families,
64 1 ALAN MmSEL, Tim RiGHT TO Dm 416-20 (1995); 2 id. at 337-39, 535-37.
65 See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 617 (1986). See also Crossley, supra
note 36, at 1639-48; C. Everett Koop, Life and Death and the Handicapped Newborn, 5 Issuns L.
& MED. 101, 109-13 (1989). For a history of infant treatment cases including cases not address-
ing the antidiscrimination laws, see 2 MmSEL, supra note 64, at 306-14.
66 The history is recounted in Bowen, 476 U.S. at 617-26; see also MESEiL, supra note 64.
67 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
68 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1994); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340 (1995). These amendments were reportedly a compromise between those favoring and
those opposing quality-of-life considerations. Capron, supra note 3, at 21.
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are governed by the disability rights laws.69 In addition, enactment of
the ADA has expanded the reach of the disability rights laws beyond
those providers receiving federal financial assistance to include all
state agencies as well as private hospitals and doctors' offices. 70
So far, two different approaches to futility disputes involving life-
sustaining care have been suggested by the courts. The first immu-
nizes from judicial scrutiny all cases in which the disputed treatment is
related to the patient's disability. The second approach rejects this
exclusion and appears to prohibit physicians from taking disability
into account when making end-of-life decisions.
a The University Hospital line of cases.-The first impor-
tant case to apply the antidiscrimination laws to individual medical
decisions about life-sustaining care was United States v. University
Hospital71 Although the case arose out of a dispute between federal
regulators and hospitals over the oversight of family (rather than phy-
sician) decisions to terminate life-sustaining care, its reasoning has ob-
vious implications for the current futility cases. That reasoning
suggested a distinction between treatment for a condition that is re-
lated to the patient's disability and treatment for a condition that is
unrelated to the patient's disability. A physician's refusal to provide
treatment for a condition unrelated to the patient's disability (such as
an ear surgery for a patient with AIDS) would be subject to the an-
tidiscrimination laws, but a refusal to provide treatment for a condi-
tion related to the patient's disability (such as corrective surgery for
spina bifida) would not be.
In University Hospital, the parents of a child born with spina
bifida, microcephaly, and hydrocephaly had decided to forego correc-
tive surgery. Their hospital had honored that request. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) sought access to the
hospital's records to determine whether improper discrimination had
occurred. In the suit brought by HHS against the hospital, the Second
Circuit stated that "[S]ection 504 prohibits discrimination against a
handicapped individual only where the individual's handicap is unre-
lated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the services in
question." 72
The court apparently based this conclusion on its reading of a
previous Supreme Court decision requiring claimants under the disa-
69 See supra note 44.
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12131, 12181(7), 12182 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995) (defining
public accommodations to include the "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other similar service establishment"); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 55-56 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 544-45. The entity must also "affect commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
71 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
72 1d. at 156 (emphasis added).
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bility rights law to prove that they are qualified despite their disabili-
ties. As interpreted by the Second Circuit, that decision requires
claimants to prove that their disabilities are irrelevant.73 Because pa-
tients who allege that they have been denied a treatment that is re-
lated to their disabilities (like corrective surgery for spina bifida)
cannot prove the irrelevance of their disability to the treatment deci-
sion, their cause of action fails.
In addition, the Second Circuit believed that proof of discrimina-
tion would be extremely difficult whenever the treatment in dispute
arises out of the patient's disability. Although the court did not say so
explicitly, it clearly recognized that plaintiffs in these cases would not
be able to prove their discrimination claims in the classic style of civil
rights litigation. That is, they could not prove that they had been de-
nied a treatment that would have been offered to similarly situated
patients who lack their disability.74 They cannot make this showing
because a patient without the same disability would not need the dis-
puted treatment.75
Furthermore, the court stated that "[w]here the handicapping
condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if
ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
'discriminatory.' "76 Medical treatment claims would invariably re-
quire expert witnesses and lengthy litigation to determine if the medi-
cal treatment decision reflected "bona fide medical judgment. '77 The
court declined to spawn this litigation without clearer proof of con-
gressional intent.
Because the court assumed that most disputed treatment deci-
sions would relate to the patient's disability,78 and because it felt that
the problems associated with this category of treatment disputes were
substantial, it endorsed the defendant's contention that Section 504
could not be "meaningfully applied to a medical treatment
decision." 79
73 Id. The court was interpreting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979) and a previous Second Circuit case interpreting Davis, Doe v. New York University, 666
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
74 See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 655 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
75 See also Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487,1493 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f such
a person were not so handicapped, he or she would not need the medical treatment and thus
would not 'otherwise qualify' for the treatment."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993).
76 729 F.2d at 157.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 156 ("[I]t is typically the handicap itself that gives rise to, or at least contributes to,
the need for services.").
79 Id.
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Although these concerns led the Second Circuit to exclude all
medical treatment decisions from the scope of Section 504,80 Justice
White recognized in a later case that the Second Circuit's concerns
would only apply when the condition requiring treatment is related to
the patient's disability. These concerns would not justify immunity
when a physician refuses to treat a condition which is unrelated to the
patient's disability.8' In his dissenting opinion in Bowen v. American
Hospital Association s2 a case decided on other grounds, Justice White
pointed out that a patient who is denied treatment for a condition that
is unrelated to his disability can compare his treatment to that of a
similarly situated patient without his disability. To illustrate the point,
he suggested that the antidiscrimination laws should apply when a
physician fails to correct an esophageal defect in a baby with Down's
Syndrome that would have been repaired in a baby without Down's
Syndrome.83
The plurality opinion in Bowen did not reach this issue.84 In-
stead, it concluded that, absent parental consent, a hospital's with-
holding of treatment could not violate Section 504.85 This effectively
removed the disability rights laws from death and dying cases in which
80 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled definitively on this issue. The plurality opinion in
Bowen held only that a "hospital rde or state policy... would be subject to challenge under
§ 504." 476 U.S. at 624 (emphasis added). However, the better view today is that the antidis-
crimination laws apply to at least some individual treatment decisions. See Crossley, supra note
36, at 1617, 1639-48. And the clear trend in the lower courts is in this direction. In re Baby K,
832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994); Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 163-66 (D. Del. 1993) (patient denied tendon repair
due to HIV status); Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990) (patient denied ear
surgery due to HIV status); see also Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 n.3
(10th Cir. 1992) (dictum), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993); Gerben v. Holsclaw, 692 F. Supp.
557,562 (E.D. Pa. 1988); State v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662,665-68 (Minn. CL App. 1992) (apply-
ing Minnesota law to denial of tendon repair due to HIV status); cf. American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395,402 (D.D.C. 1983) ("[lit cannot be said that [S]ection 504
does not authorize some regulation of the provision of some types of medical care to handi-
capped newborns."). While a more lengthy defense of this conclusion is possible, I have re-
frained from making it here because the argument for complete immunity, especially under the
ADA, has little current support.
81 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 655 (White, J., dissenting). For purposes of this point he assumed, but
did not concede, that the reasoning of University Hospital was correct. Justice White hinted that
the antidiscrimination laws should also cover denial of treatment for related conditions. Id. at
655 n.8 ("It could be argued, for example, that the [relevant] benefit provided by hospitals... is
'general medical care for whatever happens to need treating.' If this is the benefit, then a much
broader application of the statute in this context is reasonable.").
82 476 U.S. 610.
83 Id. at 655.
84 The Court noted the distinction made by Justice White between related and unrelated
conditions, but saw no need to rule on the distinction based on the facts of the case at bar. Id. at
634 n.20.
85 Id. at 630; see also Johnson by Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1492 (stating that actions by the prov-
iders which "rendered parental consent a sham" would be subject to challenge).
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families requested the cessation of life-prolonging care. It left un-
resolved the law governing physicians who balk at family requests for
life-sustaining care.
Since then, the Second Circuit's notion that all individual medical
treatment decisions fall outside of the disability rights laws has gath-
ered no additional support.86 However, its distinction between related
and unrelated conditions has been endorsed by the Tenth Circuit. In
Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, a group of Oklahoma families al-
leged that providers had improperly terminated life-sustaining care
for their disabled babies.87 The Tenth Circuit concluded that disputes
about "related" care are non-justiciable, 88 but that this immunity need
not extend to disputes about "unrelated" treatments.89
Using this approach, a physician's refusal to provide HIV-in-
fected patients with treatments for unrelated conditions such as dental
care,90 ear surgery,91 or tendon repair92 is actionable. So, too, is the
refusal to offer a heart transplant to a patient whose prognosis is im-
paired by her diabetes. 93 Decisions like these would require a legally
sufficient justification. On the other hand, the failure to close up the
spinal column of a baby with spina bifida would not be actionable
regardless of the provider's motivations, nor would the termination of
resuscitative efforts for a patient with AIDS. The University Hospital
line of cases, therefore, immunizes a broad class of bedside treatment
decisions from judicial scrutiny.
b. In re Baby K.-A second approach to bedside treatment
decisions was enunciated by the trial court in In re Baby K.94 Baby K
was born with anencephaly9s and was discharged to a nursing home
86 The better view now is that the federal disability rights laws do apply to individual medical
treatment decisions. See supra note 80.
87 Johnson by Johnson, 971 F2d at 1493-94 & n.3.
88 Ld. at 1494. Thus, it limited the reach of Section 504 to "discrimination between the non-
handicapped and the 'otherwise qualified' handicapped."
89 Id. at 1494 n.3 ("[lit would seem that the 'otherwise qualified' condition might be satisfied
under such a scenario."); accord Gerben v. Holsclaw, 692 F. Supp. 557, 561-62 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(dictum).
90 See State v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 665-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1982) (applying state law).
91 See Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990).
92 See Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. DeL 1993).
93 See David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting, 268
JAMA 1454,1457-58 (1992) (noting poorer outcomes associated with disabilities like severe dia-
betes and cancer).
94 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994).
95 According to the court, "[a]nencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is
present but the cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. There is no treatment that will cure,
correct, or ameliorate anencephaly." Id at 1025. The court described her condition as follows:
"Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot hear or see. Lacking a cerebral function, Baby
K does not feel pain. Baby K has brain stem functions primarily limited to reflexive actions such
91.798 (1997)
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soon after her birth. In the ensuing weeks, she was readmitted to the
hospital several times for treatment of her breathing problems. Her
physicians repeatedly asked her mother to discontinue ventilator sup-
port, characterizing it as "futile and inhumane. '96 Her mother re-
fused, because she believed that all life has value and that God would
perform a miracle if it were His will.97 As a result, the hospital took
the issue to court.98 The trial court ruled, inter alia, that failure to
provide respiratory assistance and other aggressive care would violate
the disability rights laws because Baby K would be denied care that
would be provided to a patient who was not anencephalic.99 The trial
court opinion in Baby K rejected the related/unrelated condition dis-
tinction, thereby making all disability-based decisions subject to
challenge.100
The trial court then refused to examine the hospital's claim that
further resuscitative efforts would be "futile" and "inhumane." In-
stead, the opinion appeared to prohibit any decisions based on pa-
tient quality of life. The court suggested that even a "dismal"
prognosis must be ignored and that an anencephalic baby must be
given the same treatment that would be given to babies without
anencephaly.' 0' Unfortunately, the trial court overlooked the hospi-
tal's statutory authority to employ necessary or essential eligibility cri-
teria, and thus, it did not consider whether the hospital's policies
would meet that threshold. The Fourth Circuit did not review these
conclusions when it affirmed the decision on other grounds. 0 2
The broad interpretation of the antidiscrimination laws espoused
in Baby K stands alone for the moment. However, it is consistent with
a prior interpretation of those laws by the Bush and Clinton Adminis-
trations. In 1991, Oregon attempted to rationalize its Medicaid spend-
as feeding reflexes (rooting, sucking, swallowing); respiratory reflexes (breathing, coughing) and
reflexive responses to sound or touch." Id. The court concluded that anencephaly is a disability
"because it affects the baby's neurological functioning, ability to walk, and ability to see or talk."
IL at 1028. The hospital conceded that its desire to withhold ventilation support was based on
Baby K's anencephaly. Id. at 1027.
96 Id. at 1025-27. Ms. K had previously rejected the suggestion of her obstetrician and ne-
onatologist that she terminate her pregnancy with Baby K. Id at 1025. Within days of the
baby's birth, her physician unsuccessfully urged a "Do Not Resuscitate order." Id.
97 Id. at 1026. God, she felt, not humans, should decide the moment of Baby K's death.
98 Both the noncustodial father and the court-appointed guardian ad litem agreed with the
hospital's position. Id. at 1026.
99 Id. at 1029.
100 Id. at 1028. The court rejected the distinction because, it concluded, the distinction would
be impermissible in the context of racial discrimination. However, it did not address the con-
cerns raised in University Hospital about the justiciability of these cases under the antidis-
crimination laws.
101 Id. at 1027-29.
102 In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 91 (1994) (affirming the trial
court ruling on the basis of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act).
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ing by ranking treatments in order of priority.103 The federal
government objected to the ranking list because it was based, in part,
on the expected quality of life of patients following treatment.1' 4
"[T]he premise that the value of life of a person with a disability is less
than the value of the life of a person without a disability" was, HHS
concluded, "inconsistent with the ADA."' 05 Although Oregon denied
that its methods impermissibly discriminated against disabled
Oregonians, it modified its ranking procedures as requested in order
to obtain federal approval of its plan.106
c. Current status of the caselaw. -The caselaw suggests two
quite different approaches to disputes about purportedly futile life-
sustaining care. One approach would immunize from scrutiny a large
fraction of the futility cases-all those in which the disputed treatment
is related to the patient's disability. The second approach would sub-
ject all medical treatment decisions to the disability rights laws and
apparently would oblige physicians to ignore the quality of life that
therapeutic intervention would offer.
Each approach has serious problems. One insulates from chal-
lenge all treatment decisions that arise out of the patient's disability,
no matter how patent the prejudice. The defensibility of this distinc-
tion between related and unrelated conditions is the subject of Part
III. The other line of reasoning corrects that omission, but then pro-
hibits providers from taking a patient's quality of life into account no
matter how cruel or pointless the provider believes the treatment to
be. A more balanced mechanism for handling cases in which the pro-
vider believes that treatment would be contrary to patient welfare is
proposed in Part IV. In addition, neither of the two existing ap-
proaches to the disability rights laws accounts for the difference be-
tween decisions based on patient welfare and those based on cost-
effectiveness. Yet, the shift in objectives has important implications
for disability discrimination claims. They are explored in Part V.
103 OREGON HEALTH SERV. COMM'N, PRIORrTZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO
Tm GoVERNoR AND LEGISLATURE (1991).
104 Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon (Aug. 3,
1992), in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 397, 409 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter].
105 Id.
106 OREGON HEALTH SERV. COmm'N, supra note 103, at 9. For a longer summary of the
negotiations between Oregon and the federal government, see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care
Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. LU. 491, 503-05 (1995). On March 19,1993, the govern-
ment granted conditional approval to Oregon based on changes that Oregon had agreed to make
and on the condition of further changes outlined in the government's response.
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III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELATED AND UNRELATED
CONDITIONS
Under the line of reasoning that distinguishes between related
and unrelated conditions, patients with disabilities can only challenge
medical decisions that deny them treatment for a condition that is un-
related to their disability. Thus, a patient with a disability, such as
AIDS, can seek relief if he is improperly denied treatment for a medi-
cal condition that is unrelated to his AIDS, such as a torn tendon in
his leg. But he would not be able to challenge a physician's decision
to deny him a desired treatment for the AIDS itself. Likewise, a sur-
geon's reluctance to close the spine of a child born with myelomen-
ingocele (a form of spina bifida) would not be actionable under the
antidiscrimination laws because the need for treatment arises out of
the patient's disability.
Yet, prejudicial treatment of persons with disabilities is not lim-
ited to circumstances in which they are denied treatment for unrelated
conditions. Ignorance or prejudice can also cause inadequate treat-
ment of the disability itself. Evidence suggests, for example, that phy-
sicians are likely to abandon life-saving efforts more quickly for
patients with AIDS than for other patients with similar prognoses.107
Similarly, the Baby Doe cases in the 1980s suggested that certain phy-
sicians were prejudiced against babies with Down's Syndrome. As
Giles Scofield has noted, "there is evidence that health care providers
do hold unwarranted beliefs about persons with disabilities, and that
such beliefs do affect their recommendations with respect to life-sus-
taining treatment. 1 08
Why then would courts adopt a distinction that immunizes a huge
class of potentially biased treatment decisions from scrutiny under the
antidiscrimination laws? The Second Circuit expressed two related
concerns. First, it believed that a disabled patient could only prove
that she was "otherwise qualified" to receive medical services if she
107 Robert M. Wachter et al., Decisions About Resuscitation: Inequities Among Patients with
Different Diseases, but Similar Prognoses, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL Mpm. 525, 525 (1989) (noting
that physicians wrote DNR orders more readily for AIDS and lung cancer patients than for
cirrhosis and heart failure patients with similar prognoses); see also Betty W. Levin et al., Treat-
ment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976,
2976-80 (1991) (survey indicating that health professions at six New York hospitals would be less
aggressive treating the life-threatening conditions of newborns infected with HIV than if the
infant did not have HIV, or had other disabilities such as cystic fibrosis).
108 Giles R. Scofield, Medical Futility Judgments: Discriminating or Discriminatory?, 25 SE-
TON HALL L. REv. 927, 934 (1995) (citing Kenneth A. Gerhart et al., Quality of Life Following
Spinal Cord Injury: Knowledge and Attitudes of Emergency Care Providers, 23 ANNALS EMER-
GENcY MEm. 807, 808 (1994); Lindsay Gething, Judgments by Health Professionals of Personal
Characteristics of People with a Visible Physical Disability, 34 Soc. Sci. & MED. 809, 809 (1992);
ML. Paris, Attitudes of Medical Students and Health-Care Professionals Towards People with
Disabilities, 74 ARCHIvEs PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 818, 818 (1993)).
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could prove that her disability was irrelevant to the treatment deci-
sion.109 Patients complaining that they have been denied care for
their disability cannot make that showing. Second, the Second Circuit
believed that proof of discrimination would be too difficult if the con-
dition to be treated were related to the patient's disability.110 In addi-
tion, the court may have been reluctant to supervise complex medical
judgments. This Part examines these three concerns and concludes
that they do not justify the immunization of an entire category of
treatment decisions.11'
A. The Problem of Qualifications
Disabled patients who are denied treatment for medical problems
arising out of their disability cannot show that their disability is irrele-
vant to the treatment decision. The Second Circuit believed that this
inability constituted a fatal defect. The court appeared to base its con-
clusion on language from an earlier Supreme Court decision, South-
eastern Community College v. Davis.112 In Davis, the Supreme Court
explained that an "otherwise qualified" disabled person under Section
504 must be able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of
his handicap. As a result, an institution need not disregard an individ-
ual's disability when it is relevant. 113 Applying this rule to medical
treatment decisions, the Second Circuit concluded that a patient's dis-
ability is relevant when the disability gives rise to the condition to be
treated. Thus, it held that the patient's disability may permissibly be
taken into account.
The court's reasoning is impeccable in all but one respect. The
court overlooked the fact that a relevant criterion can be misused.
Consider, for example, treatment decisions for patients with AIDS.
The fact that they have AIDS is obviously relevant. It creates the
need for treatment and influences the kinds of treatments that are
most appropriate. But the presence of AIDS may also lead physicians
to discriminate against these patients. Two separate studies indicate
that physicians give up more readily on patients with AIDS or HIV-
infection. 114 The fact that a disability is in some respects relevant pro-
vides no guarantee that it will not be misused. Relevant information
can be used in irrelevant, improper ways. Just as evidence admitted at
trial for one purpose will sometimes be improperly considered by the
109 University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 155-56 2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, the court seemed to think
that the very idea of "qualifications" could not be applied in the context of medical services.
110 Id.
111 Several other scholars have also rejected the distinction. See Crossley, supra note 36, at
1648-50; Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 61; Scofield, supra note 108, at 927.
112 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
113 Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
114 See supra note 107.
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jury for other purposes,115 so too a disability that legitimately bears on
the treatment decision may be misused by biased physicians.
Assume that a newborn with Down's Syndrome needs life-sus-
taining care related to her disability. Assume further that her treating
physician withholds the life-sustaining care because she believes that
the quality of life of children with Down's Syndrome is tragic. The
child's family is angered by this decision, believing that it reflects fac-
tualy inaccurate assumptions and biases about life with Down's Syn-
drome. In their eyes, stereotypical judgments like these are precisely
what Congress meant to eliminate with the ADA.
Should courts hear disputes like these on the merits? Under the
University Hospital approach, they could do so only if the life-threat-
ening condition were unrelated to the child's disability. In that event,
a decision to deny life-sustaining care to a baby with Down's Syn-
drome might well violate the ADA. But if this child's life-threatening
condition were related to her disability, the treatment decision would
be immune from scrutiny under the antidiscrimination laws. This dif-
ference in outcomes is unwarranted. To the extent that quality-of-life
judgments like this one are improper (a subject considered in Parts IV
and V), they should be excised from all treatment decisions-not
merely those in which the condition being treated is unrelated to the
patient's disability. A patient who is denied access to a therapy neces-
sitated by his disability should be permitted to prove that the decision
was motivated by bias.
B. The Problem of Proof
The more serious problem created by suits arising out of "re-
lated" care is not conceptual, but practical. Identifying biased treat-
ment decisions will be more difficult when the treatment is related to
the patient's disability than when it is unrelated. When a patient with
AIDS is denied treatment for an unrelated eardrum or dental prob-
lem, courts can easily ascertain whether the decision was based on the
patient's disability by investigating whether the treatment is offered to
similarly situated patients without AIDS. If differential treatment is
proven, then the court can insist upon a legitimate justification.116 By
contrast, when a disabled patient is denied treatment for a condition
related to his disability, there may be no similarly situated non-dis-
abled patient whose treatment can be compared. Instead, the patient
will have to adduce other evidence to prove that the provider's deci-
sion was infected by bias.117
115 FED. R. Evm. 105 (requiring the trial judge to instruct the jury when evidence is admitted
for one purpose but not others).
116 Parts IV and V consider when differential treatment might be justified.
117 In this respect, the government's suggestion in University Hospital that medical decisions
must be "bona fide" was sound. 729 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Admittedly, litigating and evaluating these claims will be difficult.
Factfinders looking for evidence of bias will have to search for it
within the complex matrix of factors influencing a physician's exercise
of medical judgment. Nevertheless, five considerations justify this ef-
fort. First' no liability will arise unless the plaintiff can convince the
court that impermissible discrimination has occurred. If the factfinder
cannot determine whether disability improperly influenced the treat-
ment decision, the claim will fail. That should provide substantial
breathing room for complex medical judgments.
Second, it is easy to imagine cases in which proof of improper
discrimination will be present. This proof might take a number of
forms. It could, for example, include scientific studies or practice
guidelines casting serious doubt on a physician's claim to have with-
held a treatment because it would not have been effective.118 In other
cases, a patient may be able to prove that the provider had made bi-
ased statements. Or plaintiffs may offer proof that patients with dif-
ferent illnesses, but similar prognoses, were offered treatments denied
to the plaintiff.'1 9 Finally, aggrieved patients may be able to prove
118 In the absence of resource constraints (considered in Part V), a patient should be able to
establish his "qualifications" for treatment by proving his capacity to benefit from treatment.
See infra note 174 (collecting authorities).
119 The courts have split on whether the antidiscrimination laws prohibit discrimination be-
tween disabilities. One line of cases suggests that the antidiscrimination laws are concerned only
with "even-handed" treatment of the disabled vis-k-vis the non-disabled and not with discrimina-
tion among the disabled. See, eg., Tbrnage v. Thrner, 485 U.S. 535,549 (1988) ("There is nothing
in [Section 504] that requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons
also be extended to all other categories of handicapped persons."); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704,
708-10 (3d Cir. 1979); Duquette v. Dupuis, 582 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-72 (D.N.H. 1984); Doe v.
Devine, 545 F. Supp. 576,585 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that equal benefits are not required, but in
fact were provided), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Another line of cases suggests a
contrary result. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding
that a health plan that insured high dose chemotherapy for some cancers but not breast cancer
violated the ADA); McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F. Supp. 99, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
the plaintiff had established a cause of action under Section 504 based on the state's higher
tuition and maintenance reimbursement to blind individuals as compared to reimbursement to
other disabled individuals).
The issue is arguably further muddied by provisions in the regulations implementing both
Section 504 and the ADA that expressly permit government programs to target, and thus favor,
specific disabilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1990) ("The exclusion of nonhandicapped persons from
the benefits of a program limited by Federal statute or executive order to handicapped persons
or the exclusions of a specific class of handicapped persons from a program limited by Federal
statute or executive order to a different class of handicapped persons is not prohibited by this
part."); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c) (1991) ("Nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from provid-
ing benefits.., to individuals with disabilities, or to a particular class of individuals with disabili-
ties beyond those required by this part."). In theory at least, this exception may also imply
tolerance of private discrimination between disabilities. As noted above, some federal courts
have given such latitude to health benefits plans. But nothing in the language of this narrowly
targeted exception suggests that prejudicial discrimination against disfavored disabilities should
be tolerated. To the contrary, the presence of this provision suggests a congressional assumption
that differential treatment on the basis of disability would ordinarily violate the general prohibi-
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that physicians used a controversial criterion, such as disability-im-
paired quality of life, in an improper manner.120
Third, patients who can make the required showing deserve a
remedy. As a corollary, the availability of a remedy will help to deter
future discriminatory conduct.
Fourth, endorsing the distinction between related and unrelated
conditions will not eliminate the need to make case-by-case evalua-
tions of disputed medical treatment decisions. Even when the condi-
tion being treated is unrelated to the patient's disability, providers will
sometimes offer justifications for differential treatment. 121 Evaluating
those justifications will require the same close scrutiny of the motiva-
tions of the provider that the Tenth and Second Circuits sought to
avoid by endorsing the distinction between related and unrelated con-
ditions. In Glanz v. Vernick, 122 for example, the defendant claimed
that his failure to perform ear surgery on an HIV-infected patient was
necessitated by the risks associated with the patient's HIV infection.
Before concluding that the patient had been improperly discriminated
against, the trial court had to evaluate the genuineness of that defense.
Consequently, endorsing the University Hospital approach will not
eliminate the difficult task of supervising individual treatment deci-
sions. It will merely reduce the number of cases in which supervision
is undertaken.
tion on disability-based discrimination. Indeed, courts, litigants, and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission have made this assumption in disputes over discriminatory limits on
AIDS coverage by health benefits plans. See EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
supra note 50; EEOC v. Tarrant Distrib., No. H-94-3001 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994), abstracted in
CCH Accommodating Disabilities, No. 36, at 5 (Nov. 1994) (detailing a case in which an em-
ployer agreed to lift its $10,000 lifetime cap on AIDS coverage); Mason Tenders Dist. Council
Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (trial court ruling permit-
ting a cause of action alleging discriminatory failure to provide insurance coverage for HIV-
related illness), abstracted in 91 HEALri L. Focus, CCH, at 2 (Dec. 21, 1993); Laborers Dist.
Council Bldg. & Constr. Health & Welfare Fund, EEOC, Charge No. 170930899 (Sept. 9, 1993),
abstracted in 62 L.W. 2232 (Oct. 19, 1993) (finding that a lower cap for HIV-related illness vio-
lated the ADA); Estate of Kadinger v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 110, No. CIV
3-93-159 (D.C. Minn. Dec. 21, 1993) (consent decree removing discriminatory lifetime cap on
health insurance benefits for AIDS), abstracted in 62 L.W. 2436 (Jan. 18, 1994). Ultimately, a
line will have to be drawn between permitted "favorable" treatment and regulated "unfavora-
ble" treatment. Thus far, neither the courts nor the regulators have attempted this task. For a
thoughtful survey of the issue and citations to additional cases, see Crossley, supra note 8, at 227-
31.
120 Parts IV and V consider the circumstances in which qualify-of-life criteria may be
employed.
121 See infra Parts IV and V.
122 750 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990); see also State v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 665-68
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting on the merits a dentist's claim that his referral of an HIV
infected patient to a university center was intended to provide the patient with better protection
from bacterial infection).
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Fifth, the "related/unrelated" distinction presents line-drawing
problems of its own that may offset the administrative advantages that
it offers. Mary Crossley first made this point in her cogent examina-
tion of treatment decisions for HTV-infected newborns. 23 To illus-
trate, she asked whether an HIV-infected child's need for
immunization was "related" to the child's HIV by virtue of the fact
that the HIV-infected child needed the immunity more than the ordi-
nary child. 124 Other difficult cases are easy to envision. Justice White,
for example, assumed that a child born with both Down's Syndrome
and an esophageal blockage presented the paradigmatic case of a pa-
tient needing a treatment unrelated to her disability. 125 But es-
ophageal defects are 100 times more common in babies with Down's
Syndrome than in other newborns. 126 Is this treatment, therefore, also
related? And what if a disability, like AIDS, makes treatment of a
purportedly unrelated condition more dangerous' 27 or less effec-
tive? 12s Is the condition then sufficiently related to the disability?
The problem of classification was present, in fact, in University
Hospital. In that case, the government argued that Baby Jane Doe
would have received surgery to correct her spina bifida and
hydrocephalus if she had not been born with microcephaly. 129 With
this argument, the government hoped both to characterize the dis-
puted care as unrelated to the disfavored disability (microcephaly)
and also to show that similarly situated patients without her disfa-
vored disability would have been treated differently. The court de-
clined to accept this framing of the case, but it never explained why.
The same kind of debate could have occurred on the facts of
Baby K.. 3 0 The hospital's attorneys would have characterized Baby
123 Crossley, supra note 36, at 1649-50. She also criticizes the distinction on the grounds that
it will sometimes be overbroad, prohibiting dissimilar treatment for unrelated conditions even
when it is defensible. Id. at 1650. While this is a reasonable reading of University Hospital, see
supra text accompanying note 77, the question of which treatment decisions to supervise can be
separated from the question of which dissimilar treatment to proscribe. In that event, endorse-
ment of the distinction between related and unrelated conditions would not commit a court to
ignoring possible justifications for nontreatment in cases involving unrelated conditions. Parts
IV and V explore the circumstances in which dissimilar treatment may be defensible.
124 Id. In my view, the intuitive answer is "yes" because the need arises out of the disability.
See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156. But that would leave providers free to exclude these
children from immunization. Judicial unwillingness to live with this outcome would push them
to a different conclusion.
125 Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 655 (1986) (White, J. dissenting).
126 Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 61.
127 See supra note 35.
128 See supra note 36.
129 729 F.2d at 150, 156.
130 In fact, the majority and dissenting opinions engaged in this very debate in connection
with a requirement of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. 16 F.3d 590,
596 (4th Cir.) (concluding that breathing difficulty was the emergency medical problem at stake),
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K's respiratory difficulties as "related" to her disfavored disability
(anencephaly). But the family's attorneys would have characterized
her respiratory difficulty as "unrelated" to her disfavored disability
(retardation).
If the distinction between related and unrelated conditions is ac-
cepted, courts will devote substantial energies to the task of policing
the border between related and unrelated conditions. They may be
surprised to discover, as David Orentlicher notes, that the body is an
integrated system and that disabling conditions can influence virtually
all other medical needs. 131 Because complete independence is rare,
courts who insist on it will insulate a vast array of treatment decisions
from any judicial scrutiny. But if they resist this approach, they will be
forced to articulate some alternative boundary. Although it is con-
ceivable that a coherent boundary would result,132 it is just as likely
that the understandable desire to reach the underlying merits of these
cases would lead courts to stretch this jurisdictional boundary in order
to achieve substantive justice. It seems better to tackle the substan-
tive issues directly and honestly.
C. Deference to Medical Judgments
Conceivably, a third rationale may be offered in defense of the
University Hospital line of cases. As pointed out by a respected legal
treatise, this line of cases may reflect judicial unwillingness to second-
guess complex medical judgments about treatment effectiveness. 133 If
so, the mechanism employed to provide breathing room for good faith
medical judgments is overbroad and unwise. The distinction between
related and unrelated conditions would insulate medical decisions
based on bias, stereotype, and false assumption.134 Furthermore,
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (concluding that anencephaly
was the relevant condition).
131 Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 61.
132 For example, the courts could treat multiple disability cases, like those in University Hos-
pital and Baby K, as justiciable because treatment decisions in these cases can be readily com-
pared to treatment decisions for patients who lack the allegedly disfavored disability.
133 BARRY FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW 556 (1995) [hereinafter FuRROW, HEALTH LAW];
see also Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 59 (suggesting that University Hospital "may reflect the
court's view that medical decisions are objective and scientific"). The American Academy of
Pediatrics made the point this way, in its brief to the Supreme Court in Bowen:
The pediatrician must assess, often without reliable medical data, the likelihood of success-
ful treatment, the risk of damage to the infant from the therapy, the effect on the child of
protracted artificial life-support care, and the pain and suffering of continued treatment.
Treatment may be life-saving, but the result of the therapy could cause other damage.
Amicus Brief at 7-9, quoted in BARRY R. FuRRow ET At., BIoETHICs, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETmcs 337 (1991) [hereinafter FuRRow, BioE-Hcs].
134 See Orentlicher, supra note 35, at 311 (claiming that deference to medical judgments risks
.condoning practices that are based on stereotypes or misleading data rather than real medical
differences").
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medical judgments about treatment effectiveness inevitably reflect
crucial value judgments. Debate about the proper range of these
value judgments lies at the heart of both the futility debate and the
discrimination claims these judgments engender. Until these substan-
tive questions about the proper range of physician value judgments
have been decided, the. range of desirable breathing room cannot be
ascertained. After that task is undertaken, ample breathing room can
be provided without offering physicians so broad an immunity. By
placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs to prove bias and permitting
physicians to consider all relevant criteria, courts can still confer sub-
stantial latitude on providers without also immunizing biased decision
making.
D. Conclusions
The distinction between related and unrelated conditions arises
out of legitimate judicial concerns about the difficulty of proving dis-
crimination. Without question, proof of invidious discrimination will
often be difficult. But endorsement of this distinction would immu-
nize a whole class of discriminatory treatment decisions. In addition,
the distinction presents line-drawing problems of its own. Further-
more, rejection of the distinction between related and unrelated con-
ditions is consistent with the tradition of broadly construing the civil
rights laws.135 Ultimately, the arbitrariness of the distinction between
related and unrelated conditions as a normative matter seems to jus-
tify acceptance of the practical difficulties.
IV. TAING DIsABirrY INro AccouNr: QuALrrY OF LIFE AS AN
INDICATOR OF PATIENT WELFARE
Once courts have determined which medical treatment decisions
they will scrutinize for compliance with the antidiscrimination laws,
they must determine the extent to which a patient's disability may be
taken into account. As explained above, the patient's disability will
often be relevant to the treatment decision, 36 especially if courts are
willing to supervise treatment decisions for related conditions. 137 Yet,
decisions based on disability can also reflect bias or ignorance. The
courts face the difficult task of distinguishing those circumstances in
which a provider has permissibly taken the patient's disability into ac-
count from those in which the provider has behaved improperly. In
the language of the disability rights laws, they must identify those in-
stances (either individually or as a class) in which consideration of the
135 See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.D.C. 1983)
(suggesting that this tradition applies to medical treatment cases).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
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patient's disability is "necessary" or "essential" to the clinic practice
and those in which the patient's disability is either an irrelevant con-
sideration or one that has been misused.
Disability-based discrimination can occur both when a provider
relies on quantitative measures of treatment futility, such as the im-
pact of disability on the odds or duration of success,138 and when the
provider acts on qualitative indicia of futility, such as the impact of a
patient's disability on his quality of life. 3 9 However, quantitative fac-
tors are less controversial than quality-of-life judgments both because
of their superficial objectivity and because providers who use them
are not discounting the value of life with a disability.14° Although
quantitative criteria do pose serious disability rights issues,141 the most
serious objections to physician futility judgments are raised when phy-
sicians take disability-impaired quality of life into account. 142 For that
reason, quality-of-life judgments will be used in this Article as the ve-
hicle to test the application of the disability rights laws to physician
futility decisions.
This Part examines the circumstances under which providers
should be permitted to consider disability-impaired quality of life
138 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
140 Quantitative factors are therefore more universally recognized to be relevant. See FUR-
ROW, HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 133, at 94 (arguing that it is proper to base treatment
decisions on medical effectiveness); Crossley, supra note 36, at 1646 (claiming "medical effects"
of a disability should be a proper consideration); see also infra text accompanying notes 231-34
(noting greater scholarly acceptance of quantitative criteria, at least at the extremes).
141 For example, a physician presumably cannot rely on unfounded assumptions about poorer
outcomes for disabled patients. In addition, physicians arguably have no business making futility
decisions when the patient or the family is available to make the treatment decision. See infra
text accompanying notes 158-64 (discussing the standing issue in connection with quality-of-life
judgments) and supra notes 17-20 (pointing out that the desirability of a small chance for addi-
tional life is a value judgment arguably best made by the patient or the patient's family). In
addition, the reasonable accommodation requirement may limit exclusions based on quantitative
factors, such as the odds of success, to the most bleak cases. See Orentlicher, supra note 50, at
72. The disability rights issues raised by quantitative factors become even more complex when a
physician bases his refusal to treat on the obligation to steward scarce health care resources,
rather than on patient welfare. See infra note 238.
142 Quality-of-life judgments do not raise the same issue when the disputed treatment is qual-
ity-enhancing rather than life-extending. When the treatment is quality-enhancing only, such as
surgery for hip discomfort, the impact of the treatment on patient quality of life can be assessed
without placing a value on preservation of the patient's life. As a result, quality-of-life consider-
ations do not threaten the principle of equal worth when the condition being treated is not life-
threatening. To that extent, they are much less controversial. On the right set of facts, however,
quality-of-life assessments could raise disability rights issues even in connection with noncritical
care. Under a rationing system based on relative effectiveness or cost-effectiveness, for example,
treatment of the disabled patients could conceivably receive a lower priority for funding than
treatment of non-disabled patients if, because of co-morbidities, disabled patients showed less
improvement from the therapy than non-disabled patients. For an examination of these issues,
see Peters, supra note 106, at 543-46.
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when deciding whether further life-extending care would advance a
patient's welfare. Part V then explores the additional issues raised
when poor quality of life influences a provider's conclusion that po-
tentially beneficial life-extending care would, nevertheless, constitute
a poor use of health care resources.
A. Objections to Quality-of-Life Considerations
1. All Lives Have Equal Worth.-To withhold life-sustaining
care from a disabled patient because his quality of life is poor is to
discount the value of that patient's life because of his disability. Crit-
ics believe that this discounting offends the ideal that each person's
life has equal value, regardless of disability, and is entitled to equal
protection.143 From this perspective, quality of life is an irrelevant and
discriminatory criterion that should not be used to make end-of-life
treatment decisions.144
In its strongest form, this is an argument against ever discounting
the value of life. As the Association for Retarded Citizens wrote in an
amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court ten years ago,
The a priori assumption [of physicians who resist treatment] .. . is
not that the child cannot or will not live, but rather that because of his or
her handicap the infant's life has such diminished value that the child
should not live.... There is no more central civil rights issue than a life
and death difference in treatment based on a different and lesser valua-
tion of a human life attributable to membership in a particular group.145
Under this argument, patients with severe disabilities should be
given access to treatments like ventilators and artificial nutrition with-
out regard to their quality of life. In the early days of the death and
dying debates, this was called a "sanctity of life" argument.146
In addition, opponents of quality-of-life judgments can argue that
these judgments are so susceptible to abuse that they should be pro-
hibited even if courts reject the argument that they are per se im-
proper. Determining whether a patient's quality of life is so impaired
that life-extending treatment is no longer worthwhile requires a very
subjective value judgment. Because of this subjectivity, bedside treat-
ment decisions by providers are susceptible not only to error and in-
143 See, eg., Amicus Brief of the Association for Retarded Citizens at 6-9, Bowen v. Ameri-
can Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), quoted in FuRRow Biorm'cs, supra note 133, at 335-36;
Robert A. Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of Natu-
ral Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. &
PoL'Y 71, 96-99, 118 (1986).
144 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 29, at 836-37, 843-44 (stating that quality-of-life considera-
tions violate the disability rights laws); Bopp & Avila, supra note 39 (same).
145 Amicus Brief of the Association for Retarded Citizens, supra note 143.
146 See, e.g., Richard A. McCormick, The Quality of Life, The Sanctity of Life, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1978, at 30, 35.
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consistency, but also (and this is the discrimination concern) to
unequal treatment based on prejudice against, or ignorance about, life
with a disability. 147 This discretion is especially troubling in light of
mounting pressures to contain costs that may increase the temptation
to reduce care to disabled patients whose care is expensive and incon-
venient, such as the demented elderly.148 Yet, policing these judg-
ments would require difficult line-drawing between quality-of-life
judgments that are reasonable and unbiased and those which are ob-
jectionable. In addition, they present the danger of a slippery slope
on which less and less severe disabilities might be deemed worse than
death.
From this perspective, every disabled patient whose life can be
extended with available medical technology should be considered
'qualified" to receive that therapy no matter how poor her quality of
life. Provider attempts to establish minimum thresholds of quality of
life ought not be considered "necessary" or "essential." In addition,
the reasonable accommodation requirement arguably obliges health
care providers to accede to requests for life-extending care. Comply-
ing with these requests would not constitute the kind of "fundamental
alteration" of medical practice that the statutes preclude. 149
Although neither the statutory texts nor the legislative histories
provide any further guidance on this issue, the only court to address
the issue directly has ruled that disability cannot be taken into ac-
count. In Baby K, a federal district court refused to examine the hos-
pital's claim that further resuscitative efforts for an anencephalic baby
would be "futile" and "inhumane.' 150 Instead, it suggested that even
a "dismal" prognosis must be ignored and insisted that an
147 See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 8, at n.79; Martha A. Field, Killing "The Handicapped"-
Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1993); John A. Robertson, Involuntary Eu-
thanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 253-55 (1975) (ques-
tioning quality-of-life arguments). While Field concedes that some babies may be better served
by withholding care, she suggests that there are too few such cases to take the risk of permitting
best interests decisions, even by families. Field, supra, at n.53.
148 Rationing decisions could easily be disguised as decisions based on patient welfare. When
physicians in Britain were forced to restrict access to health care because of rationing policies
dictated by their national health plan, they reportedly rationalized them as in the best interests
of the patient. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1984), reprinted in
WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL, HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 796-
97 (4th ed. 1990).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 57-62 (discussing reasonable accommodation
requirement).
150 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 91 (1994). Although other cases have considered the relevance of a patient's disability to
treatment decisions about noncritical care, none has addressed the question in the context of
life-extending care.
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anencephalic baby be given the same treatment that would be given to
babies without anencephaly.151
The Baby K trial court's assumption that disability must be ig-
nored may have been shared by the Second Circuit. In its University
Hospital opinion, that court stated that "[S]ection 504 prohibits dis-
crmination... where the individual's handicap is unrelated to, and
thus improper to consideration of, the services in question."'152 This
language gives the impression that it is presumptively improper to
take disability into account when the treatment is unrelated to the
disability.
The federal government took a similar view of end-of-life judg-
ments about quality of life when it responded to the highly publicized
Oregon Medicaid plan.15 3 Oregon proposed to rank treatments in de-
scending priority in order to determine which treatments would be
funded by its Medicaid plan. The Department of Health and Human
Services objected to the ranking scheme because the ranking method-
ology considered patient's quality of life.154 Michael Astrue, who was
the general counsel of the HHS at the time of Oregon's original appli-
cation for Medicaid waivers, called Oregon's use of quality-of-life con-
siderations "the most troubling element of the process."'1 55 "[T]he
premise that the value of the life of a person with a disability is less
than the value of the life of a person without a disability," was, HHS
concluded, "inconsistent with the ADA.' 56
From this perspective, quality-of-life judgments are morally im-
proper, susceptible to abuse, and prohibited outright by the antidis-
crimination laws. Because quality of life is an improper consideration,
its use should be barred not only by physicians and hospitals, but by
all other actors governed by the antidiscrimination laws, including
state courts, court-appointed guardians, state executive agencies, and
state legislatures. Indeed, the most forceful critics of quality-of-life
judgments would also bar families from taking quality of life into
account. 5 7
151 Id. at 1028, 1029. The Fourth Circuit did not review the trial court's conclusions when it
affirmed the decision on other grounds. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (affirming the trial court ruling on the basis of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act).
152 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
153 For a brief summary of the disability rights issues raised by the Oregon plan, see Peters,
supra note 106, at 502-05.
154 Sullivan Letter, supra note 104, at 409. Oregon denied that it had violated the ADA, but
nonetheless made the changes requested by the federal government. OREGON HEALTH SERvs.
COMM'N, PRiORnTiZATION OF HEALTH SmRVicEs: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLA-
TuRE 9 (1993); Peters, supra note 106, at 504 (describing the negotiations).
155 Michael J. Astrue, Pseudoscience and the Law: The Case of the Oregon Medicaid Ration-
ing Experiment, 9 Issuts L. & MED. 375, 381 (1994).
156 Sullivan Letter, supra note 104, at 410.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68; cf Bopp & Avila, supra note 39.
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2. Patients and Families, Rather than Physicians, Should Make
These Judgments.-In addition to a frontal attack on all quality-of-life
judgments, patients and their families can also mount a more narrow
challenge to physician futility judgments. Given the subjectivity of
quality-of-life judgments, patients and families can reasonably argue
that physicians should defer to them regarding the adequacy of the
patient's quality of life. The argument is especially powerful when the
patients themselves have concluded that aggressive treatment would
be beneficial.
On first examination, this appears to be an argument for protect-
ing patient and family autonomy, not one raising issues addressed by
the antidiscrimination laws. In fact, however, the question of standing
has a plausible place in antidiscrimination analysis. Under the disabil-
ity rights laws, a patient's disability may only form the basis for an
unfavorable treatment decision if taking the disability into account is
necessary or essential to the program that does so. In the context of
bedside futility disputes, the dispositive question, therefore, is
whether quality-of-life judgments are necessary or essential for the
practice of medicine. Physicians arguably have no need to make these
judgments when patients or their families are available to do so.
An analogous issue arose under Title VII when employers argued
that women could be excluded from dangerous jobs for their own
safety. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, for example, a state had excluded
women from certain jobs in a male maximum-security penitentiary. 158
The Court permitted this practice because the employment of females
for this job would have presented a threat to prison security and to the
safety of others. But the Court strongly suggested that this discrimi-
nation would not have been proper if the only people endangered
were the female guards. 159 "[I]t is the purpose of Title VII," the Court
suggested, "to allow the individual woman to make that choice for
herself.' u6 0 Later, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.161 the Court repeated this admonition, emphasizing that "danger
to a woman herself does not justify discrimination."' 62
By analogy, critics of physician futility judgments can assert that
patients with disabilities ought to be permitted to decide for them-
selves whether their quality of life justifies withholding life-sustaining
care. Physicians, like employers, should accept their patients' deci-
sions even if that means providing care that the physicians would not
158 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977).
159 Id. at 335 ("In the usual case, the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for
women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of 'ltle VII to allow the
individual woman to make that choice for herself.").
160 Id.
161 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
162 Id. at 202.
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wish for themselves. 163 Title III of the ADA is consistent with this
contention. It permits public accommodations to exclude disabled in-
dividuals who pose "a direct threat to the health or safety of
others,"' 64 but it says nothing about the exclusion of disabled persons
for their own well-being. According to this reading of the antidis-
crimination laws, patients, not physicians, should decide when life-sus-
taining treatment would advance their welfare.
B. The Opposing View: Physicians Must Consider Quality of Life
Juxtaposed against these arguments for barring quality-of-life
judgments by health care providers is the viewpoint that quality of life
matters and that physicians have an obligation, both as independent
moral agents and as fiduciaries, to opt out of treatments that they rea-
sonably perceive to be cruel or pointless.
1. Quality of Life is a Proper Consideration. -Medical ethicists
widely agree that quality of life is relevant to end-of-life treatment
decisions.165 From this perspective, decisions about life-sustaining
care would be tragically uninformed if a patient's quality of life were
ignored. Patients in advanced, extremely painful stages of terminal
cancer, in vegetative states, or with painful birth defects like Tay-
Sachs disease will sometimes be better served by foregoing aggressive
or invasive life-sustaining care. As Richard McCormick once ex-
plained, every person is of equal value, but not every life.166 Compe-
tent patients prove this point on a daily basis through their decisions
to decline life-sustaining care and their execution of advance direc-
tives. Because quality of life matters, ignoring it would leave an im-
163 Physicians would remain free, of course, to differ with patients about nondiscriminatory
matters, such as whether the treatment in fact works.
164 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994) (emphasis added); accord 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (1995). The
rules governing employment discrimination are more unclear because the statute speaks only of
harm to others, but the regulations include harm to the employee. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(3) (1994) with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995).
165 See, e.g., BEAuCHAMo & CHInREss, supra note 8, at 215-19; PREsmENT's COMM'N FOR
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LInE-SusTAumIo TRMEmr A REPORT ON rim EThICAL, MEDICAL
AND LEGAL IssUES IN TREATmENT DECISIONs 218-19 (1983); James Drane & John Coulehan,
The Best-Interest Standard. Surrogate Decision Making and Quality of Life, 6 J. C NICAL E-mcs
20, 22-23 (1995); Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality
of Life Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283 (1985). Even some conservative commentators appear
to tolerate consideration of a patient's overall interests in the most compelling cases. See, e.g.,
PAUL RAMmEY, Ermcs AT Tr= EDGE OF LIFE 191-93, 212-16 (1978) (discussing Tay-Sachs,
Lesch-Nyhan disease, and anencephaly, respectively). For a review and critique of the ethical
literature, see Crossley, supra note 36, at 1622-27; Philip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the
Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 891, 946-50 (1989).
166 McCormick, supra note 146, at 35.
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poverished and inaccurate assessment of a patient's genuine interests
in further treatment.
For this reason, most states permit surrogates to take quality of
life into account. 167 Others do so without admitting it.168 For exam-
ple, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Judge Liacos dis-
claimed the use of quality-of-life considerations even as he relied on
them in balancing the state's interests against Mr. Brophy's. 169 And in
the New Jersey case In re Jobes, Judge Pollock, in a concurring opin-
ion, objected to the use of quality-of-life considerations, but then dis-
ingenuously permitted the withholding of life-sustaining treatment
from a woman in a persistent vegetative state on the ground that
treatment was merely forestalling her inevitable death.170 Patients,
families, and judges take quality of life into account because it mat-
ters.171 Without question, current social norms permit consideration
of quality of life, at least by patients, their surrogates, and the courts
that supervise them.
Even critics of quality-of-life judgments have unwittingly ac-
knowledged the relevance of quality of life. They have done so by
acknowledging that the burden imposed by a treatment (rather than
by a disability) is a relevant consideration.1 72 Yet, the burden imposed
167 1 MEISEL, supra note 64, at 383-88,416-25. When evidence of patient preferences is inade-
quate to make a decision on that basis, most (but not all) courts permit the surrogate to base the
decision on the patient's best interests. ld. at 402. Some courts reject best-interests decisions in
name, but permit them in fact. ld. at 398-99. Only a few states insist that the patient have
explicitly stated her preferences. See, e.g., In re Mary O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
168 See 1 MaEIsE, supra note 64, at 398-99.
169 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
170 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (Pollock, J., concurring).
171 In fact, the Missouri durable power of attorney statute, which specifically disavows dis-
crimination on the basis of disability, specifically permits decisions based on the patient's prog-
nosis and the burdens and benefits of treatment. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 404.870, 404.822 (1994).
172 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 29, at 840 ("In considering the best interests of a child with a
severe disability the benefits and burdens of treatment must be weighed, not the quality of life of
a patient."); Edward R. Grant, Medical Futility: Legal and Ethical Aspects, 20 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 330 (1992). In Grant's view, all life is presumed to be equally compelling, but in
some cases the burden of treatment may outweigh the benefit of life. ld. at 333.
This distinction was initially suggested two decades ago by the noted ethicist, Paul Ramsey,
as a way of limiting the instances in which families ought to be permitted to decline life-ex-
tending care. RAMSEY, supra note 165, at 180-81. It reappeared in the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in the case of Nancy Cruzan and in the well-known case of Joseph Saikewicz. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,423-24 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd, 110 S. CL 2841 (1990); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (Mass. 1977) (permitting con-
sideration of the patient's retardation only to the extent that it exacerbated the pain and
disorientation of chemotherapy). The distinction has rhetorical appeal under the disability rights
laws because it segregates treatment decisions based on the burdens of disability (prohibited)
from decisions based on the burdens of treatment (permitted). However, as indicated in the
text, the distinction lacks a normative foundation. As a result, it has not influenced the main-
stream legal and ethical debate about the withholding of life-extending care and should not be
adopted as a part of disability rights analysis. Indeed, even Missouri and Massachusetts have
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by a life-sustaining treatment, like the burden imposed by a disability,
is relevant only because it reduces the quality of life that the patient
will have if life-extending efforts are made. Whether the burden is
imposed by treatment or by disability, the same ultimate judgment
must be made: will the patient enjoy a minimally acceptable quality of
life if life-sustaining care is offered? By conceding that this question is
a proper one when evaluating a burdensome treatment, critics of qual-
ity-of-life judgments have implicitly conceded that quality of life is a
relevant consideration.
For all of these reasons, a powerful case can be made that quality
of life is an ethically permissible consideration. Advocates of this po-
sition also can make a reasonable argument that it is a legally proper
consideration as well. Both the ADA and Section 504 permit consid-
eration of a patient's disability when it affects the patient's ability to
meet "necessary" or "essential" eligibility criteria. 173 These provisions
reflect congressional recognition that disability, unlike race, is some-
times relevant to a person's qualifications. Presumably, a patient who
will not benefit from a disputed treatment cannot demonstrate that he
is qualified to receive it.174 Yet, a patient's capacity to benefit from
life-sustaining care cannot be accurately determined without taking
into account the quality of life that the patient will enjoy if treatment
is offered. The opinion in Baby K completely overlooked this fact
begun to retreat from it. See Murphy v. Wheeler, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (limiting
Cruzan to vegetative patients in need of nutrition and hydration and permitting best interests
assessments to be made for other patients); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626,
636 (Mass. 1986) (stating that it would ignore quality of life, but then permitting the withdrawal
of tube feeding, a procedure that the trial court had determined was not highly invasive or pain-
ful, because the patient would have considered it "degrading and without human dignity").
173 See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
174 Capacity to benefit is presumably a permissible eligibility criterion. See, e.g., Majors v.
Housing Auth., 652 F.2d 454,457-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a woman with a mental disabil-
ity who required a dog was capable of enjoying the full benefit of public housing); Camenish v.
University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated as moot, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (find-
ing that a deaf student could perform well, unlike the student in Davis who would not realize the
principal benefits of nursing school); Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 673 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (requiring a state to show that persons excluded are "incapable of experiencing the bene-
fit" targeted by a state program of attendant care), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994); Glanz v.
Vemick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991) (ruling that an HIV-infected patient's ability to
benefit from ear surgery would determine his qualifications); U.S. COMM'N ON CrvIL RioHTs,
ACCOMMODATING TE SPEcrRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABnxrms 115 (1983) (noting that capability
of benefitting is one standard used). See also Douglas . Besharov & Jessica D. Silver, Rationing
Access to Advanced Medical Techniques, 8 J. LEO. MED. 507, 529 (1987) ("A good argument can
be made that anyone who can benefit from a heart transplant under purely medical criteria is
otherwise qualified."); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND.
LJ. 491, 523 (1995) (discussing the notion of capacity to benefit and collecting cases); see also
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,655 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
patient who "would benefit from" treatment is "thus otherwise qualified").
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and, as a result, mistakenly assumed that the disability rights laws pre-
cluded consideration of Baby K's anencephaly. 175
Furthermore, Congress gave no hint that the ADA was meant to
exclude quality-of-life judgments from end-of-life treatment decisions.
That omission is telling because critics of quality-of-life judgments
have tried for decades to outlaw their use.176 Initially, opponents of
quality-of-life judgments unsuccessfully asked state courts to bar fami-
lies from making quality-of-life judgments when deciding whether to
authorize life-sustaining care for loved ones. Most states rejected this
suggestion. 177 Then, opponents of quality-of-life decisions attempted
to use the federal disability rights laws to prevent families from with-
holding care from seriously ill newborns. 178 These efforts were de-
feated in a series of lawsuits culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowen v. American Hospital Association.179
Congress responded to the Baby Doe cases by enacting the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984.180 Those amendments require states re-
ceiving federal financial child abuse grants to treat the withholding of
life-sustaining care from newborns as child abuse unless (1) the child
is comatose, (2) the treatment would merely prolong dying or be futile
in terms of survival, or (3) the treatment would be both virtually futile
and inhumane.' 8 ' The first and third of these circumstances clearly
reflect quality-of-life judgments and the second may as well.182 Pas-
sage of this legislation revealed Congress's willingness to permit some
quality-of-life judgments, as well as its ability to draft specific restric-
tions when deemed necessary. Against that history, it is noteworthy
that Congress did not choose to extend these restrictions to older chil-
dren and adults by placing similar restrictions in Section 504. Nor did
Congress include these restrictions when it enacted the ADA in 1991.
It is possible, of course, that Congress left these restrictions out of
the disability rights laws because it assumed that Section 504 (and
later the ADA) would bar quality-of-life judgments by physicians,
state courts, state-appointed guardians, social service agencies, and
175 832 F. Supp. 1022,1028-29 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 91 (1994).
176 See Grant, supra note 172, at 330-31 (noting that the underlying issue remains the same);
see also Bopp & Avila, supra note 39 (acknowledging that the issue is not new and suggesting
that the ADA changed the legal landscape).
177 See supra note 64.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
179 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
180 These amendments were reportedly a compromise between those favoring and those op-
posing quality-of-life considerations. Capron, supra note 3, at 21.
181 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 1340
(1995).
182 See Weir, Pediatric Ethics Committees: Ethical Advisers or Legal Watchdogs?, 15 LAw
MED. & HEALTH CARE 99,103 (1987); see also NORMAN CANTOR, LEGAL FRONrmS OF DEATH
AND DYIO 178-79 (1987).
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other entities governed by the antidiscrimination laws. But this read-
ing is inconsistent with a committee report on a predecessor of the
ADA stating that "nothing in this legislation is intended to prohibit a
physician from providing the most appropriate medical treatment in
the physician's judgment." 83 More importantly, this reading is incon-
sistent with the historical setting against which the ADA was enacted
in 1991-a setting in which state law commonly permitted anticipated
quality of life to be taken into account at least by patients, surrogates,
and the trial courts supervising them. Congress would surely have sig-
naled its intention to bar state courts from taking quality of life into
account. Yet, it did not.
From the perspective of those who favor quality-of-life judg-
ments, the difficult question is not whether quality of life is a permissi-
ble consideration, but whether treating physicians are among the
persons permitted to take it into account.
2. Physicians as Moral Agents.-In addition to the argument
that quality of life is a relevant and legally proper consideration, phy-
sicians can also make a reasonable argument that they, like patients
and families, should be permitted to consider it. Otherwise, they
could be forced to render care that they perceive to be cruel or point-
less. Advocates of granting physicians the autonomy to opt out of
futile care correctly point out that physicians are independent moral
agents. 184 Their consciences matter. Otherwise, as Judith Daar notes,
they would be treated as mere "medical vending machines."' 8 5 Forc-
ing physicians to provide treatments that they perceive to be cruel or
pointless would constitute a fundamental alteration in their practice of
medicine. It would violate their ethical obligation to do no harm,186
and it would default on their social responsibility to steward health
care resources. For these reasons, physicians can argue that they have
an independent responsibility to act and make recommendations con-
sistent with patient welfare.
183 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 63 (1989) (Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report
accompanying The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989).
184 See Daar, supra note 8, at 1245; John C. Fletcher, The Baby K Case: Ethical and Legal
Considerations of Disputes About Futility, II BIoLAw S:219, S:227 (1994) (recognizing the moral
agency of both physician and family); E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Cas-
ualties of Coercion, HAsaiNGs CE.rR REP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 33, 37.
185 Daar, supra note 8, at 1245 (quoting Lawrence J. Nelson & Robert M. Nelson, Ethics and
the Provision of Futil4 Harmful, or Burdensome Treatment to Children, 20 CRmCAL CARE MED.
427 (1992)).
186 See, eg., BEAuc ,wM & CimpRrss, supra note 8, at 214 (stating that it is unjustified for
clinicians to treat against a patient's best interests); FuRRow, HEALTH LAW, supra note 133, at
767 (noting ethical obligation to treat patients with dignity); Miles, supra note 16, at 311.
835
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Furthermore, a prohibition on quality-of-life considerations could
interfere with communications between providers and patients. 8 7 If,
as some have suggested, 188 advice to patients that takes the extent of
their disability into account could constitute a violation of the antidis-
crimination laws, then physicians would no longer be able to reveal
their honest opinions about future treatment to families without fear
of potential civil rights liability. Yet, open communication between
patient (or family) and provider is a necessary and essential compo-
nent of this fiduciary relationship.
This argument does not suggest that physicians have greater
standing than patients or their families to decide whether a patient
would benefit from aggressive care. However, it insists that physicians
have a moral stake as well. From this perspective, obliging physicians
to provide treatment that they believe to be cruel or pointless would
fundamentally alter their role and, thus, is not required even as a rea-
sonable accommodation to their disabled patients. Otherwise, the dis-
ability rights laws would force physicians to provide life-sustaining
care to suffering patients like Baby Rena (an eighteen-month-old dy-
ing of AIDS), 8 9 Baby L (a blind, deaf and quadriplegic two-year-old
in pain), 190 and Jane Doe (a thirteen-year-old Georgia girl with an
irreversible degenerative neurological disorder).191
C. Critique
When dissecting these competing viewpoints about physician
quality-of-life judgments, several related questions must be kept in
separate focus. The first is whether quality of life is a per se improper
consideration. If so, all actors governed by the antidiscrimination laws
would be prohibited from taking it into account. Such a prohibition
would limit the discretion not only of physicians and hospitals, but
also of state courts and court-appointed guardians. If quality of life is
not a presumptively prohibited consideration, the next question is
whether health care providers (as distinguished from families, guardi-
ans, or state courts) may permissively take quality of life into account.
In effect, this is a standing question. The third question is what re-
strictions to place on health care providers who do have standing to
consider patient quality of life. Such restrictions might include an ob-
ligation to defer to clearly proven patient wishes, an obligation to co-
operate with the transfer of the patient to a provider who is
sympathetic to the family's wishes, and a requirement that the physi-
187 Cf. Daar, supra note 8, at 1245.
188 Mary Crossley, Infants with Anencephaly, the ADA, and the Child Abuse Amendments, 11
IssuEs L. & MEND. 379, 402-03 (1995-96).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
190 See supra text accompanying note 33.
191 See supra text accompanying note 32.
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dan's asserted beliefs about patient welfare be genuine and reason-
able. In the pages that follow, each of these issues will be discussed.
1. The Fundamental Value Conflict.-Disputes between families
of disabled patients who view life in any condition as a-benefit and
physicians who believe that life-extending care is not always a blessing
arise out of a fundamental disagreement about the meaning and value
of life. As medical ethicist Haavi Morreim observes, rational dis-
course cannot resolve this dispute. 192 Yet, as she points out, choosing
between these two viewpoints means compelling one side to abide by
the moral choices of the other. 193
What role should the disability rights laws play in this conflict?
On the one hand, Congress has chosen to limit physician freedom of
action whenever exercising that freedom would produce improper dis-
ability-based discrimination. In this respect, the value choice has al-
ready been made. On the other hand, Congress has given remarkably
little guidance for determining whether quality-of-life judgments re-
sult in the kind of discrimination that Congress meant to prohibit.
Given the generality of the governing texts and the absence of legisla-
tive history to aid in interpreting the antidiscrimination laws, the
courts have substantial discretion to apply them to futility cases as
they see fit.
Reasonable people disagree about the relevance of quality of life.
Given the difference of sincere and reasonable opinion over this fun-
damental matter and the absence of legislative guidance, courts
should be reluctant to conclude that one of these two conflicting view-
points violates public policy.194 This caution is especially appropriate
in light of the widespread judicial and social acceptance of quality-of-
life judgments by surrogates making end-of-life treatment decisions.
As a matter of legislative interpretation, therefore, there is insufficient
basis for reading a total prohibition on quality-of-life judgments into
the antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, which contemplate some quality-
of-life judgments.
Furthermore, as a matter of ethics and public policy, this resolu-
tion of the dispute would be too one-sided. Most obviously, it would
draft reluctant physicians into the service of families who disagree
with them. Physicians could not refuse to render treatments that they
192 Morreim, supra note 184, at 34.
193 1& at 33-36.
194 My willingness to tolerate quality-of-life judgments may be influenced by my own belief
that quality of life matters. In addition, I believe that the argument for prohibiting quality-of-life
considerations altogether is weakened by disability rights advocates' acknowledgement that
quality of life is relevant when a treatment (rather than a disability) imposes a burden on the
patient. See supra text accompanying note 172.
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believed to be cruel. Furthermore, if state courts are also barred from
taking quality of life into account, providers could not seek a judicial
ruling that the requested treatment is abusive. They could not even
ask that the patient be transferred to another physician.195 They
might also be barred from letting quality of life play a role in their
recommendations to families.196 One can sympathize with the hopes
of Baby K's mother for a miracle without believing that the disability
rights laws permit her to conscript her physicians in this fashion.
Less obviously, but even more disturbingly, a blanket prohibition
of quality-of-life considerations would apply to other actors, such as
state courts, court-appointed guardians, and social service agencies,
who routinely must make decisions about patient welfare. 197 When
these individuals and agencies make decisions about a patient's best
interests, they too would be obliged to ignore the patient's quality of
life, even if there were no family member willing or available to make
the decision' 98 or if the family's wishes appeared to be contrary to the
patient's interests. 199 Legislatures might be similarly barred from tak-
ing disability-related quality of life into account when drafting legisla-
tion to regulate death and dying. This would work a substantial and
probably unintended change in the substantive law of surrogate deci-
sion making.
Given the absence of legislative guidance about quality-of-life
judgments, the presence of reasonable disagreement on the issue, and
the broad implications of a total prohibition, courts should not inter-
pret the antidiscrimination laws to make disability-impaired quality of
life a forbidden consideration. A blanket prohibition would be both
too wide-reaching and too blunt. It would be too wide-reaching be-
cause it would not merely privilege families over physicians in futility
disputes, but it would also prohibit courts, guardians and others from
taking quality of life into account. It would be too blunt because it
would ignore the consciences of physicians who believe that they are
being asked to administer cruel or pointless treatments.
A more subtle solution to the futility disputes would be prefera-
ble, one which focuses more discretely on the dispute between physi-
cians and families and which respects each party's values to the
195 At least one medical commentator has erroneously assumed that transferability would
moot the legal issues. Miles, supra note 16, at 312. While it may preclude a tort abandonment
claim under some circumstances, a transfer motivated by antidisability bias would be actionable
under the ADA. See Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990).
196 See supra note 188.
197 If, as seems likely, state courts constitute an "instrumentality of a State," then Title II of
the ADA applies to them. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994); see also supra note 40.
198 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977); Crossley, supra note 8, at 186.
199 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 29, at 825-27 (describing the case of Baby Terry).
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maximum extent possible.200 Such a solution should respect physi-
cians' consciences while, at the same time, preserving for families the
opportunity to seek the help of physicians who share their views about
aggressive life support.201
Before the contours of a compromise of this kind can be mapped,
however, a preliminary question must be answered. Do physicians
have standing under the antidiscrimination laws to take disability-im-
paired quality of life into account when patients or their families are
available to make the treatment decision themselves?
2. Standing to Consider Quality of Life. -Before physicians may
permissibly take a patient's disability into account, they must demon-
strate that doing so is "necessary" or "essential" to their practice.
Physicians will probably be able to make this showing when they gen-
uinely believe that life-extending treatments requested by family
members would be contrary to patient welfare. They will have far
more difficulty doing so when the patient has personally requested the
disputed life-sustaining treatment. In both circumstances, the physi-
cians will have a more powerful claim for freedom of conscience when
the treatment is reasonably perceived to be cruel than when it is
merely believed to be pointless or wasteful.
a. Conflicts with patients. -Physicians will have difficulty
establishing the requisite necessity when the patient has personally re-
quested life-sustaining care. That is the lesson of the Title VII cases
forbidding employers from excluding female employees from danger-
ous jobs. This interpretation of the antidiscrimination laws is also con-
sistent with the provisions of the ADA, which specifically authorize
consideration of any threat that a disabled patient poses to the safety
of others, but do not specifically authorize efforts to protect a disabled
person from dangers to himself. Furthermore, deference to the pa-
tient's assessment of his own interests would seem to constitute the
kind of reasonable accommodation required by the antidiscrimination
laws.
Still, a plausible argument can be made for respecting physician
consciences. Physicians can point out that their position is different
from that of employers who are barred from making paternalistic
judgments on behalf of their female employees. Physicians, unlike
those employers, could be forced to personally provide care that they
believe to be cruel or harmful.202 From their perspective, the more
200 Morreim, supra note 184, at 33.
201 Daar, supra note 8; Morreim, supra note 184, at 38.
202 The Supreme Court's Title VII analysis may also be distinguishable on other grounds.
Most obviously, the Supreme Court's observations were made in the context of BFOQ analysis.
Proving a BFOQ is harder than showing a business necessity. In addition, the Court was inter-
839
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appropriate analogy is to the living will statutes203 and abortion legis-
lation2° that permit physicians to opt out when patients demand care
that would violate their moral convictions. Physicians can argue that
the antidiscrimination laws should similarly respect their independent
moral agency.20 5
Furthermore, protection of physicians' consciences would be con-
sistent with state tort law. Under typical state common law, physi-
cians need not honor requests for non-customary care.206 Indeed, on
proper notice they may end their relationship with patients whose
preferences regarding even customary care differ from their own.2 0 7 If
patient and physician disagree about a course of treatment, each view
is partially respected. Physicians can opt out, but may not make a
unilateral decision to terminate care. Instead, the patient must be
given reasonable notice and an opportunity to locate a provider who
shares her views. In this way, tort law respects the views and con-
sciences of both parties. Arguably, the antidiscrimination laws should
strike a similar compromise when physicians resist treatments that
they believe are contrary to patient interests.
In the context of the disability rights laws, however, the argument
for freedom of conscience has a serious weakness when the patient
has personally requested the disputed care. Although it is true that
physicians will be more intimately affected than employers are if they
are obliged to defer to patient wishes, it will be extraordinarily rare
when a life-sustaining treatment personally requested by the patient
will present a threat to the physician's moral compass on par with a
request to perform an abortion or to let the patient die. In each of
those other settings, physicians seek the freedom to opt out of conduct
that they believe constitutes the killing of another human being. On
the right set of facts, perhaps, a compelling case for freedom of con-
science might be presented when a patient requests life-sustaining
care, but these cases are likely to be too rare to dictate the shape of
the antidiscrimination laws.
More typically, a physician's desire to opt out of life-sustaining
treatments personally requested by the patient will be motivated by
the belief that the requested treatment will confer little or no material
preting a statutory text requiring that eligibility criteria be related to ability to work. By con-
trast, the language governing eligibility criteria for medical services (necessary and essential) is
more general and potentially places fewer restrictions on consideration of disability.
203 See infra note 213.
204 See Daar, supra note 8, at 1241-45 (collecting and discussing authorities).
205 If they adopt this view, courts interpreting the disability rights laws would have to con-
clude that it is necessary and essential for physicians to opt out of care that they do not believe
will advance the welfare of their patients, even when the patient disagrees.
206 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th
ed. 1984).
207 JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACncE 23 (2d ed. 1986).
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benefit upon the patient and is, therefore, wasteful. The physician's
conscience objection in these cases is more likely to arise out of con-
cerns about the wise use of scarce resources than out of allegiance to
the patient's welfare. As discussed later in Part V, decisions based on
resource allocation concerns will sometimes be justified. But they
raise additional issues that deserve separate consideration. To the ex-
tent that a physician's objection to "pointless" care is based solely on
qualms about patient welfare, however, the argument for freedom of
conscience is relatively weak.
b. Conflicts with families.-By contrast, the argument for
physician standing is much stronger when the family, rather than the
patient, has made the determination that aggressive life support is
warranted. Assume, for example, that Mr. Wanglie had not known his
wife's wishes. In that event, his own views about her welfare would be
pitted against the views of her providers. Or assume that a parent
insists on unrestricted treatment for her newborn. Unlike disputes be-
tween patients and providers, these conflicts are not about paternal-
ism, but about the allocation of power between third parties who
disagree about the patient's welfare. Under these circumstances, a
stronger case can be made that a physician's freedom to challenge
family decisions is a necessary and essential part of her fiduciary obli-
gation to her patient, especially when the physician reasonably be-
lieves the requested treatment to be cruel, rather than merely
pointless or wasteful. Although the physician's standing may not be
equal in stature to that of the family and would not justify unilateral
cessation of treatment without a court order, it seems sufficient to jus-
tify the physician's recusal from the case when she believes that the
requested care would be cruel. In the language of disability rights
laws, an obligation to render cruel treatment would fundamentally al-
ter medical practice. As a result, it exceeds the requirement of rea-
sonable accommodation.
The distinction proposed here between decisions made by pa-
tients and those made by families is consistent with the language of
the regulations implementing the ADA. Those regulations authorize
disabled patients to decline services that would otherwise be man-
dated by the ADA, but expressly refuse to authorize guardians or rep-
resentatives of disabled persons to decline medical treatment.208
Although the regulations make this distinction in the context of family
objections to life-sustaining care, rather than family requests for such
care, they support the principle that patient preferences are entitled to
greater deference than family wishes.
208 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e) (1995).
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3. Seeking a Better Accommodation. -If physicians sometimes
have standing to take quality of life into account, how is their use of
this discretion to be monitored? Just as a complete prohibition on
quality-of-life considerations would be too blunt a solution to the ethi-
cal dispute between families and physicians, so too is unfettered physi-
cian discretion. As Haavi Morreim has noted, this resolution would
simply transfer the power to coerce from families to physicians.20 9
Without some further restriction on their conduct, physicians would
be free under the antidiscrimination laws to protect their own con-
sciences while ignoring the values of families who disagree. Not only
would a family be unable to insist on aggressive treatment, but a phy-
sician would be free to cease treatment without giving advance notice
to the family or offering them the opportunity to transfer the patient
to another physician. Furthermore, physicians could not be chal-
lenged even if their judgments appeared to reflect patent bias, such as
an unwillingness to treat patients with Down's Syndrome or AIDS as
aggressively as other patients with similar prognoses.
Two kinds of limits on physician discretion are necessary. First,
physicians should be obliged to cooperate with the transfer of the pa-
tient to a physician who shares the family's views. Second, even opt-
ing out of treatment should be prohibited when families can prove
that this decision was not a good-faith medical judgment, but instead
was motivated by improper bias.
a. Notification of the family and cooperation with trans-
fer.-Because futility disputes arise out of a fundamental values con-
flict, Morreim suggests that an ideal solution would respect each
actor's values to the maximum extent possible.210 Using this reason-
ing, physicians should be permitted to opt out when families request
treatments that physicians genuinely and reasonably perceive to be
contrary to patient welfare, but they should not be permitted to force
their own views on patients and their families. The same moral plural-
ism that supports the freedom of physicians to take quality of life into
account, supports the family's freedom to seek like-minded health
care providers. As a result, both Morreim and Judith Daar have rec-
ommended that physicians be permitted to opt out of the physician-
patient relationship when futility conflicts of this kind arise, but not to
unilaterally terminate care.211 Under this compromise, the family
would remain free to seek the services of a physician or hospital that
shares their evaluation of the patient's interests. In this way, the val-
ues of each disputant are protected without privileging one view en-
tirely over the other. Morreim would also impose a duty upon
209 Morrein, supra note 184, at 33, 35.
210 ld. at 33.
211 Id. at 38; Daar, supra note 8.
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providers to give early notice to families of their personal convictions
so that patients are not left stranded.212 As a matter of policy, this
compromise has considerable intuitive appeal. By encouraging com-
munication between physician and family it would also help ensure
that any misunderstandings are cured and that, if possible, a mutually
agreeable treatment plan is designed.
In addition, this "opting out" solution has some precedent in the
state law doctrines governing the withholding of life-sustaining care
and medical malpractice. State statutes governing living wills and
health care surrogates, for example, commonly provide some protec-
tion for physicians or hospitals who have moral objections to the ter-
mination of life-sustaining care.213 However, patients and their
families remain free to transfer to other providers. Physicians who
exercise their right to opt out are commonly required to cooperate or
assist in transfer of the patient.214
There is even some authority for this compromise when physi-
cians, rather than families, believe that life-sustaining care should
cease. Several states, as well as the U.S. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, have recently enacted statutes or regulations explicitly rejecting
any obligation to render medically ineffective care.215 In addition,
under traditional tort law, physicians who disagree with a family's de-
mands need only provide customary care. They are not obliged to
offer every intervention that a family or patient demands.216 Even
that duty ends if the provider terminates the relationship with reason-
212 Morreim, supra note 184, at 38. Judith Daar later made the same suggestion about early
notice. Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 AM. J.L. &
MED. 221, 239 (1995).
213 See CHOICE IN DYING, INC., 1995 RIGHT-To-DiE LAw DioEsT (Noncompliance Provisions
in Living Will Statutes; Noncompliance Provisions in Statutes Authorizing Health Care Agents).
when the question is not governed by a statute, the courts have split. Compare, eg., Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 26 (Mass. 1986) (holding that a hospital does not have to
participate in removing life-sustaining measures, but that it must assist in transferring a patient
to a doctor who will) with Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that hospital must follow patient's wishes to have life-sustaining measures
discontinued).
214 Daar, supra note 8, at 1277-80.
215 Minnesota Living Will Act, MIN. STAT. § 145B.05 (1996) (stating that physicians are
bound to comply with living will "within the limits of reasonable medical practice"); Health Care
Decisions Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1992) (declaring treatment not required if
"medically or ethically inappropriate"). The Veterans Administration also concluded that treat-
ments which "would not accord with prevailing medical practice.., need not be presented for
patient consideration." DEPARTmENT OF VETERAs AsAmts, V~rRAaNs HEALTH ADnmis-
ThATIO N, 1993, MAruAL M-2, Clinical Affairs, pt. I, ch. 31, "withholding and Withdrawal of
Life-Sustaining Treatment," quoted in Bethany Spielman, Futility and Bargaining Power, 6 J.
CLINICAL ETICs 44, 49 (1995).
216 See KEETON ET Ai., supra note 206, § 32, at 185-89; KING, supra note 207, at 39-43 (dis-
cussing standard of care).
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able notice.217 As a result, allowing physicians to "opt out" of family
requests for morally objectionable care has respectable precedent.
It is not entirely clear, however, that this compromise can be im-
posed using the disability rights. The most promising doctrinal vehicle
for achieving this objective is the statutory requirement of reasonable
accommodations. Under the ADA and Section 504, physicians who
wish to take disability-impaired quality of life into account must make
reasonable modifications of their policies and practices before con-
cluding that a patient is ineligible for treatment. Conceivably, this
reasonable modification requirement could be construed to require
both notification of the patient's family of the provider's unwillingness
to offer life-sustaining care and also cooperation with transfer of the
patient.
This approach would require the courts to apply the reasonable
accommodation requirement in a novel way. Ordinarily, reasonable
accommodations must be offered to determine whether a disabled
person can, with such accommodations, meet a program's eligibility
requirements.218 If a disabled person cannot qualify for requested
benefits, even with reasonable accommodations, then denial of those
benefits (and of the accompanying accommodations) does not violate
the antidiscrimination laws. In the futility cases, by contrast, notice
and transfer would not qualify the disabled patient for treatment by
the recalcitrant physician. Instead, this accommodation would enable
the patient to receive treatment from another physician who shares
the patient's values. Viewed this way, a notice and transfer require-
ment seems analogous to requiring an employer to help an unquali-
fied job applicant find a job elsewhere. To the extent that this analogy
is fair, a notice and transfer requirement would make new law.
But the analogy is only superficially correct. The circumstances
of futility disputes are quite different from those of employment dis-
crimination disputes and of the other typical contexts in which disabil-
ity discrimination issues arise. In disputes over life-sustaining care,
the treating health care provider has control over the patient's body
and life. Given the physician's control over the catastrophically ill pa-
tient and the finality of a unilateral cessation of treatment, the patient
is far more dependent on the physician than a job applicant is on a
potential employer. The rejected job applicant can look for anotherjob; the patient whose life support is unilaterally withheld cannot look
for another physician. Because of this difference, the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement must be interpreted creatively in order to
treat all parties fairly. Only with notice and the opportunity to trans-
217 See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a doctor
who gave sufficient notice could relinquish obligation to continue treatment of a woman with
renal disease); KING, supra note 207, at 23-29.
218 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994) ("necessary to afford such ... services").
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fer can the "rejected" patient look elsewhere for a provider whose
criteria he can meet.
Courts should, therefore, require that physicians who wish to opt
out of life-sustaining care cooperate with transfer of the patient,21 9
unless they have obtained a judicial determination that the requested
care would be abusive. This requirement will protect the patient's fu-
ture options while only temporarily interfering with the physician's
freedom. If courts are unwilling to employ the reasonable accommo-
dations requirement in this novel way, then a statutory amendment
will be needed to strike this compromise, unless state law is used to fill
the gap.22 °
b. Placing a limit on biased decisions. -Patients should be
permitted to prove that physician recalcitrance, ostensibly based on
patient welfare, is actually explained by another, less defensible mo-
tive, such as an aversion to persons with the patient's disability. A
refusal to provide CPR to a patient with advanced AIDS or one with a
drug dependency might fall into this category. A recent study showing
that AIDS patients are treated less aggressively than other patients
with similar prognoses may reflect this kind of bias.22 1 As a result,
some judicial scrutiny of physician actions must be retained, even
when the physician requests only to be replaced by another physician.
Indeed, transfer of patients is one way that providers are alleged to act
on their bias against patients with AIDS.222
219 It is not clear whether the antidiscrimination laws could support an obligation to treat the
patient if transfer were impossible. Arguably, the reasonable accommodation requirement man-
dates as much. On the other hand, the reasonable accommodation requirement has already
been stretched quite far to encompass an obligation to assist in transfer of a patient whose antici-
pated treatment the provider believes to be cruel. Requiring treatment when transfer efforts fail
seems to go beyond accommodation and effectively trumps the physician's claim of conscience.
Indeed, the patient's inability to locate a physician who will provide life-sustaining care goes a
long way to establishing the reasonableness of the recalcitrant physician's views. However, no
firm conclusions can be drawn until we have some clinical experience with an "opt out" compro-
mise and have a better sense of its actual consequences.
220 The hornbook law of malpractice is already nearly sufficient to play that role. Because
reasonable notice is already required before a physician terminates her relationship with a pa-
tient, see supra text accompanying note 207, the only troubling shortcoming in traditional state
law is the possibility that physicians would be permitted to forego life-extending care within an
existing relationship if the treatment is not customary. See supra note 206. As yet, no reported
decision has addressed this issue. As a result, state court imposition of a duty to offer non-
customary life-sustaining care pending transfer is uncertain. Because the policy reasons behind a
duty to cooperate with transfer are powerful, however, it is quite possible that state courts will
impose it. However, because the question is currently unanswered as a matter of state law,
federal courts can ensure a suitable balance between the rights of patients and physicians by
imposing this obligation using the reasonable accommodations requirement.
221 See supra note 107.
222 See, eg., Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990).
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The difficult task, of course, will be to determine whether a physi-
cian's refusal to treat is based on beliefs that can be confidently char-
acterized as biased or whether, instead, the refusal arises out of a
genuine and reasonable disagreement with the family about the pa-
tient's welfare. Whenever the physician's views fall outside the range
of reasonable disagreement about the harmfulness or cruelty of a re-
quested treatment, a strong suspicion will arise that the decision was
not motivated by a good faith belief about harm to the patient and
instead reflects prejudice or ignorance. Searching for impermissible
bias in these cases will require fact-finders to make hard decisions
about provider motives.223
Applying this approach to medical treatment decisions, we might
expect fact-finders to excuse a request to opt out of further resuscita-
tive efforts for a suffering child like Baby Rena, but not to tolerate a
refusal to perform an esophageal repair on a patient with Down's Syn-
drome. A refusal to repair this condition on a baby with Down's Syn-
drome appears to reflect distorted factual assumptions about the
quality of life of persons with Down's Syndrome. 224 For this reason, a
court is likely to conclude that the decision to let the patient die falls
outside of the range of reasonable disagreement about the harmful-
ness of treatment and, therefore, reflects impermissible bias. While
judicial scrutiny of these cases will be difficult, some supervision
seems necessary in order to avoid abuse of the latitude given to prov-
iders to opt out of treatment.
D. Synthesis
Courts should rule that quality of life is not a perse improper cri-
terion for end-of-life decisions. However, physicians should be re-
quired to defer to clearly proven patient preferences. When the
patient's actual wishes are unknown, as with newborns, physicians
should be permitted to opt out of treatments they genuinely and rea-
sonably believe to be cruel, even if they have based this conclusion on
the anticipated quality of life. However, physicians should be re-
quired to inform families of their objections to further treatment and
to cooperate with the transfer of the patient to a physician who shares
223 If this task proves too difficult, Congress will need to specify statutorily the permissible
range of physician discretion, much as it has done with the Child Abuse Amendments. See infra
text accompanying notes 258-59 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of this approach).
In the absence of such legislation, however, the courts could fashion a default rule similar to the
one proposed in the text.
224 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 8, at 218; E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,
Exoticare, and Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 897
(1995). Requiring that the physician's views fall within the range of reasonable disagreement is
conceptually similar to the "respectable minority" rule of malpractice doctrine that exonerates
physicians so long as they "pursue one of several recognized courses of treatment." Downer v.
Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974); KING, supra note 207, at 65-66.
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the family's views. Furthermore, physicians should be denied the
power to opt out of treatment when their decision reflects demonstra-
ble bias on the basis of disability.
When physicians resist providing care because it would be point-
less or wasteful, however, and not because they reasonably believe it
will be harmful, they are asserting a justification more firmly rooted in
concerns about the wise use of finite health care resources than in
protection of patient welfare. Treatment decisions based on allocation
concerns raise additional issues that are discussed in Part V.
V. ALLOCATING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES
At present, none of the litigated futility cases has produced an
explicit claim that a requested treatment would simply not be a wise
use of scarce resources. Yet, concerns about prudent resource alloca-
tion are surely part of the landscape against which these disputes
arise. A recent study by Mildred Solomon revealed that physicians
often use medical language like "futility" and "medically indicated" to
mask value judgments about the adequacy of benefits provided by
treatment.225 Also, Mark Hall has noted that futility decisions about
CPR increasingly incorporate cost-effectiveness calculations.226
Indeed, the current climate of intense cost-consciousness surely
helps to explain why futility cases are surfacing with increasing fre-
quency.227 The national public debate in anticipation of the Clinton
health plan reminded us all of the excessive costs and inadequate ac-
cess that characterize our health care delivery system. In addition to
this heightened consciousness about responsible stewardship of health
care resources, the emergence of managed care organizations has
given an increasing number of providers concrete financial incentives
to reduce health care costs. Not surprisingly, providers are no longer
as receptive to family requests for medical treatments of dubious ben-
efit. Over time, these concerns can only become both more prevalent
and more patent.
Allocation decisions based on the relative effectiveness of a re-
quested treatment present potential disability rights issues whenever
the treatment's ineffectiveness is associated with the patient's disabil-
ity. A physician, for example, may feel that aggressive treatment for
225 Mildred Z. Solomon, How Physicians Talk About Futility: Making Words Mean Too Many
Things, 21 J.L MED. & ETnmcs 231 (1993); see also S. Van McCrary et al., Physicians' Quantita-
tive Assessments of Medical Futility, 5 J. CLINICAL Eimcs 100, 102 (1994) (noting that physicians
consider lifesaving treatment to be futile if the odds of success fall below a cutoff point).
226 Hall, supra note 4, at 723-25 (collecting medical authorities).
227 See, e-g., John D. Lantos, Futility Assessment and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 42 J.
AM. GaUATmcs Soc'y 868, 869 (1994) (linking prospective payment systems with the futility
debate); Miles, supra note 22, at 514 (noting that Helga Wanglie received roughly $700,000 in
care "paid for by people who had not consented to underwrite [this] level of medical care").
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premature babies is wasteful whenever the patient's disabilities are so
severe that any extension of life, even if arguably beneficial, will be
brief and unpleasant. For the same reason, a transplantation team
might refuse to allocate organs to patients with disabilities like pulmo-
nary disease, cancer, or retardation because these conditions signifi-
cantly reduce the odds that the transplant will succeed.22
In one respect, the disability rights issues raised by these ration-
ing practices are similar to those raised by the treatment decisions dis-
cussed in Part IV. In each context, a disabled patient is denied life-
sustaining care because her physicians believe that her disability
makes the extension of her life either less likely or less beneficial than
it would otherwise be. In each context, courts must determine
whether the disability rights laws permit health care providers to con-
sider the impact of patient disability on treatment effectiveness. How-
ever, a number of additional considerations surface when access to
life-sustaining medical care is resisted, not because it would be con-
trary to patient welfare, but because it would be a poor use of re-
sources. Most obviously, the underlying justification for opting out is
different and requires its own defense. In addition, the range of cases
in which patients might be disfavored by their disability is far broader.
It is broader because the rationing of relatively ineffective care could
mean the denial of access not only to treatments that are perceived to
be positively harmful, but also to treatments that the provider per-
ceives to be pointless and even to treatments that are admittediy ben-
eficial, as evidenced by the example of organ transplantation in the
preceding paragraph. Finally, the shift in objectives has implications
for the allocation of decision-making authority. Neither patients nor
physicians have so obvious a claim to protection of their personal val-
ues when the underlying goal is stewardship of collective resources,
rather than protection of patient welfare.
Thus far, no court has considered the additional issues raised
when a provider resists giving life-sustaining care because it would be
a poor use of resources.2 9 However, the Bush and Clinton Adminis-
228 See supra text accompanying note 35.
229 In none of the reported bedside futility cases litigated in the U.S. thus far has the provider
or insurer explicitly raised the question of wise resource allocation in court. The judicial focus
has been upon the competency of surrogate decision makers and the interests of the patient. See
supra notes 2-4; supra text accompanying notes 26-33. However, a court in the United Kingdom
reportedly ruled in 1992 that a London hospital could withhold life support from a severely
brain-damaged eighteen-month-old child on the ground that it had "too few resources to treat all
the patients whom they would like to treat." Re J [A Minor][Medical Treatment] (C.A. 10 June
1992), quoted in Ross Kessel, British Judges Cannot Order Doctors to Treat, HAsTINGS CENTER
REP., July-Aug. 1992, at 3-4.
Although American courts have not addressed the disability rights implications of bedside
treatment decisions, they have sometimes relied on resource limits as a basis for permitting pri-
vate and governmental benefits plans to selectively assist specific disabilities. Seesupra note 119
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trations objected when Oregon proposed an experimental Medicaid
plan that considered patient quality of life.23 0 Although Oregon de-
nied that the plan discriminated improperly against patients with disa-
bilities, it modified the plan as requested to obtain prompt federal
approval of its novel Medicaid plan. As a result, no judicial analysis of
the additional issues raised by allocation decisions has yet been
undertaken.
This Part first considers the circumstances in which rationers
should be permitted to consider the impact of disability on treatment
effectiveness. After concluding that quality of life is a permissible
consideration, but only if confined within narrow limits, the text then
considers the circumstances in which physicians have sufficient stand-
ing to make bedside allocation decisions that take disability into
account.
A. Efficiency and the Disability Rights Laws
As Mark Hall notes, rationing decisions involve a "fundamental
and unresolved tension" between allocating resources to those with
the most to gain and distributing resources without regard to disabil-
ity.231 On one side of the debate are those who believe that scarce
health care resources should be allocated where they will do the most
good. Health economist David Hadorn, for example, emphasizes the
wisdom of minimizing human suffering as much as available resources
permit.23 2 He and many other commentators have concluded that so-
ciety legally can and ethically should consider the effectiveness of
medical treatment, even when disability-based classifications result.23 3
Allocations that fail to take the effectiveness of a treatment into ac-
count would, under this view, grossly misallocate resources toward
life-extending care of dubious benefit. Irrational and unaffordable
health care would result.
(collecting cases). However, unlike the bedside futility disputes, none of the plans at issue in
those cases denied access to life-sustaining care based on quality of life.
230 See Sullivan Letter, supra note 104; Peters, supra note 106, at 502-03 (describing the nego-
tiations between Oregon and the federal government).
231 Hall, supra note 4, at 711.
232 Hadom, supra note 93, at 2225; see also Alan Williams, Economics of Coronary Artery
Bypass Grafting, 291 BRrr. MED. J. 326, 328-29 (1985) (arguing for redeployment of resources
such that benefits "are high in relation to costs").
233 LARRY R. CHURCHILL, RATIONING HEALTH CARE iN AMERIcA 95, 121-25 (1987);
Hadorn, supra note 93, at 1454, 1547; Paul T. Menzel, Some Ethical Costs of Rationing, 20 LAw
Mm. & HEATHm CARE 57 (1992); Karen J. Merrikin & Thomas D. Overcast, Patient Selection
for Heart Transplantation: When Is a Discriminating Choice Discrimination?, 10 J. HEALTH POL
PotY & L. 7, 15-18 (1985) (concluding that disabled candidates may be excluded if they are
"unable to benefit" or have "[no] reasonable chance of a successful clinical outcome"); Oren-
tlicher, supra note 35, at 312 (endorsing likelihood, duration, and degree of benefit); Steven A.
Toms, Outcome Predictors in the Early Withdrawal of Life Support Issues of Justice and Alloca-
tion for the Severely Brain Injured, 4 J. CLniCAL ETHmcs 206, 210 (1993).
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On the other side of the debate are egalitarians who contend that
relative medical effectiveness is not a morally sufficient basis for treat-
ing one patient differently from another.23 4 For them, the susceptibil-
ity of a patient's condition to successful therapy simply does not
reflect the patient's virtue, merit, or worth.235 That a person's disabil-
ity deprives her of an equally promising prognosis is tragic enough
without compounding that misfortune by denying equal access to po-
tentially beneficial medical care. Containing costs by singling out
these patients is, therefore, improper.236
The tension between these two views is illustrated in the third
edition of Beauchamp and Childress' classic treatise on bioethics. The
text first endorses a "fair opportunity" principle requiring equal distri-
bution of social benefits unless the differences are ones for which the
affected persons are responsible. Yet, it later accepts as an "unargued
premise" that it is "morally imperative" to take medical utility into
account in an effort to "save as many lives as possible through the
available resources. '237
This conflict between efficiency and equality colors all efficiency-
based rationing decisions, but it is much less pronounced when quanti-
tative, rather than qualitative, measures of treatment effectiveness are
used.23 8 Like Beauchamp and Childress, other scholars who object in
234 See, e.g., ROBERT M. VEATCH, TmE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE 138-45 (1986) (arguing for
equality in resource allocation); Jerry Avom, Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care: Turn-
ing Age Discrimination into Health Policy, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1294 (1984); John Harris,
QALYfying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ET-cs 117, 120, 122 (1987) (arguing that life expec-
tancy is irrelevant); John Harris, Unprincipled QALYs: A Response to Cubbon, 17 J. MED. Em-
ics 185 (1991) (objecting to both life expectancy and quality of life considerations); Robert M.
Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18
AM. J.L & MED. 15, 29 (1992); see also Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Recipient Selection for
Organ Transplantation, in ORGAN SUBSTITITION TECHNOLOGY- ETmICAL, LEGAL, AND PuBLic
PoLIcY IssuES 86, 93 (Deborah Mathieu ed., 1988) (describing the arguments for an equal
chance or lottery to ration scarce organs).
235 See Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 234, at 121.
236 See Morreim, supra note 224, at 887 (describing this view).
237 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLEs OF BIOMEDICAL ETmcs 270-72, 296-97 (3d ed.
1989).
238 Quantitative measures of treatment effectiveness are less controversial than quality-of-life
assessments because they do not treat the lives of disabled persons as less valuable. As with
patient welfare decisions, however, rationing based on quantitative factors can raise discrimina-
tion issues of its own. From a strong egalitarian perspective, factors like the odds of success
should not be used when the result is to disfavor persons with disabilities. That could occur, for
example, when a patient with schizophrenia is excluded from a heart transplantation program.
See Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 57. Egalitarians dislike exclusions of this kind because the
patient's poor odds do not reflect the person's worth, merit, or need. Harris, QALYfying the
Value of Life, supra note 234, at 117,121. David Orentlicher cogently argues that poor outcomes
may be the product of a biased allocation of research funding and interest. Orentlicher, supra
note 50, at 66-71. Nevertheless, even egalitarian scholars seem to have conceded that a point can
be reached when the odds of success are too low to justify the cost. See infra text accompanying
notes 239-40. And the federal government has apparently permitted Oregon to take odds into
850
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principle to allocations based upon efficiency have, nonetheless, con-
ceded that treatments which rarely work2 9 or provide only brief relief
at high cost need not be provided, even if the result is to disfavor some
patients on the basis of their disabilities.24 0 Otherwise, potentially
limitless resources would have to be committed to nearly hopeless
care. To this extent, these egalitarian critics of utilitarian rationing
schemes have conceded that efficient use of available resources is, at
least at the extremes, a legitimate objective. This concession disap-
pears, however, when qualitative, rather than quantitative, measure-
ments are used to allocate life-sustaining care.241
The objection to qualitative rationing of life-sustaining care is
that it devalues the lives of patients with severe disabilities.242 This, of
course, is the same objection raised against qualitative futility judg-
ments purportedly based on patient welfare (discussed above in Part
IV). On one level, therefore, qualitative rationing decisions present
the same substantive issue. When the treatment decision is based on
resource allocation considerations, however, rather than protecting
patient welfare, a number of additional considerations deserve atten-
tion as well.
account in its Medicaid plan. See Peters, supra note 106, at 522-23. As a legal matter, however,
the issue remains unresolved. For a more extended discussion of the issue, see Orentlicher,
supra note 50, at 58, 71-74; Peters, supra note 106, at 517-33.
Even if quantitative considerations are deemed permissible, other disability rights issues will
remain. For example, the rationing decision must not be based on unfounded, stereotypical
assumptions about the outcomes of patients with disabilities. Less obviously, David Orentlicher
has suggested that the reasonable accommodations requirement restricts the use of effectiveness
data to situations where the expected benefit is "minimal" and the cost of the treatment would
be "high." Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 72-73. His proposal is a logical corollary of the idea,
noted above, that discrimination should be tolerated only at the extremes. Although most futil-
ity cases are likely to lie at this extreme, a discrimination claim may lie in the case that does not.
239 See Robert M. Veatch, Justice and Outcomes Research: The Ethical Limits, 4 J. CLn.iCAL
Eamcs 258 (1993) (concluding that rationing of marginally effective care is inevitable).
240 See Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 72 (stating that it is appropriate to ration care that fails
to provide a reasonable minimum benefit and incurs a high "monetary" or "financial" cost).
241 See, eg., Letter from Timothy B. Flanagan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to Susan K. Zagame, Acting General Counsel, U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (Jan. 19, 1993), in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 418 (1994);
Attachment to Sullivan Letter, supra note 104, at 409, 410-12; James V. Garvey, Note, Health
Care Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: What Protection Should the Dis-
abled Be Afforded?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 583-84, 615 (1993); Nancy K. Stade, Note,
The Use of Quality of Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving a Rejected Proposal, 93
CoLum. L REv. 1985, 2010, 2017-20 (1993) (suggesting that quality of life considerations violate
the ADA, but recommending that the statute be amended to permit their use). This was one
basis of the Federal Government's objection to the Oregon rationing plan. Sullivan Letter,
supra note 104, at 409; see also Peters, supra note 106, at 503-04.
242 It is important to note, however, that no threat to the principle of equal worth arises when
quality-enhancing, rather than life-saving care is rationed because no value needs to be placed
on the patient's life. For a lengthier discussion of the distinction between quality-enhancing and
life-sustaining care, see Peters, supra note 106, at 543-46.
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First, rationing decisions do not purport to advance the affected
patient's current interests. At most, they advance the patient's ex ante
(and hypothetical) interests in affordable medical care. More con-
cretely, these decisions advance the interests of other taxpayers and
insurance subscribers in affordable and more rational medical care.
The change in justifications is highly material. While I personally en-
dorse the use of quality-of-life considerations to maximize the benefits
obtained from finite health care resources, there is no societal consen-
sus on this issue similar to that which supports the use of quality-of-
life judgments to advance patient welfare. Although there is no legis-
lative history to indicate that the efficient allocation of finite resources
is an illegitimate goal,243 there is also none to suggest that Congress
either endorsed health care allocations based upon treatment effec-
tiveness or contemplated quality-of-life criteria as a means of allocat-
ing health care efficiently. Furthermore, the debate about rationing
criteria is so fresh that we lack a robust body of ethical literature and
popular experience from which to extrapolate sound legal doctrines.
Second, the use of quality-of-life considerations to make ration-
ing decisions would greatly expand the circumstances in which dis-
abled patients could be disfavored. Rationing decisions deny access
not only to treatments believed to be contrary to patient welfare, but
also to treatments believed by the provider (but not the patient) to be
pointless and even to treatments likely to be beneficial. Beneficial
treatments could be rationed, for example, because the benefit is
small, the odds are long, or the cost is relatively high. As a result,
patients who would probably benefit from a treatment could be de-
nied access to it if the marginal benefit is believed to be exceeded by
the cost. Likewise, naturally scarce resources like transplantable or-
gans could be denied to severely disabled patients who stand to bene-
fit from them on the theory that other patients would benefit more.
Consequently, a quadriplegic patient with heart disease could be as-
signed a lower priority for organ transplantation than a heart patient
without paralysis on the theory that treatment of the quadriplegic pa-
tient would produce less benefit.2" Because allocation decisions are
243 Programs that seek to allocate their available resources in a way that will maximize health
outcomes can presumably prove that consideration of effectiveness is "necessary" or "essential"
to achieve their objective. See id. at 517-20. The harder question is whether the objective of
maximizing outcomes is itself sufficiently essential to justify disability-based classifications. See
id. at 520-46. The uncertainties about this question explored in the text make judicial caution
appropriate. For a more extended discussion of the issue in the context of health benefits plans,
see i.
244 A corollary of this shift from protecting patient welfare to maximizing health benefits is
that the value of saving one life must be compared with the value of saving another life. To say
that one patient's life is less worth saving than another's seems different from saying that a
particular life-sustaining therapy should be foregone because the patient will not benefit. Ra-
tioning pits life-saving care for one patient against life-saving care for another.
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not limited to circumstances in which physicians and families disagree
about the likelihood that the patient would benefit from treatment,
they greatly expand the number of cases in which a disabled patient
could be disfavored because of a poor quality of life.
Third, the financial savings likely to be obtained by supplement-
ing quantitative measures of treatment effectiveness with qualitative
ones are currently unknown.24 5 It is possible that most of the cases in
which rationing based on quality of life could be successfully advo-
cated already warrant rationing on some other basis that does not
threaten the principle of equal worth (such as previously expressed
patient preferences or low odds of success). If so, the cases that turn
on qualitative criteria may not produce sufficient savings to justify the
ethical and symbolic costs. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
the cost savings will be used to fund more cost-effective care or to
make health care more affordable. As a result, reasonable accommo-
dations might require that qualitative criteria be reserved for the
clearest cases.24 6
Finally, the standing of physicians to act on their own values (and,
thus, to take disability into account) is less obvious when the decision
turns on the wastefulness of the expenditure rather than harm to the
patient. When, for example, a patient or her insurer is willing to fund
a requested treatment that the provider believes to be wasteful, the
physician's claim of conscience lacks the power that it has when the
provider seeks to opt out of personal participation in a life-extending
treatment that she sincerely believes to be cruel.
Cumulatively, these concerns justify great caution when consider-
ing whether health care providers should be permitted to make full
use of the greatly expanded range of quality-of-life judgments that ra-
tioning decisions could entail. However, these concerns must be bal-
anced against the arguments that quality of life is relevant. Advocates
of rationing based on quality-of-life considerations, including ethicist
Paul Menzel and health economist David Hadorn, support the use of
quality-of-life rankings to prioritize health decisions.24 7 From their
245 Although none of the existing medical studies examine the impact of quality of life consid-
erations, several recent studies have found that cost savings from the rationing of borderline care
would be less than might be expected. See, eg., Alexander M. Capron, Medical Futility: Strike
7Ivo, HAsma' s CaNrra REP., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42, 43 (reporting on a study of care offering a
less than 1% chance of two-month survival); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, The
Economics of Dying: The Illusion of Cost Savings at the End of Life, 330 Naw ENG. J. MNED. 540,
540-43 (1994).
246 Just as an employer must accept some lost economic benefit to result from its obligation to
make reasonable accommodations, so too must a provider or health plan. See Orentlicher, supra
note 50, at 75.
247 See, eg., Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CA. L REv. 1449, 1510
(1994) (suggesting that most people would want it to play more than a supplemental role); David
C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and Public Policy, HAsn Nos
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perspective, maximizing the health benefits obtained from available
health care resources is a legitimate policy objective.24 Advancement
of that objective requires consideration of the relative effectiveness of
requested treatments. In the language of the disability rights laws, the
effectiveness of a requested treatment is an "essential" or "necessary"
eligibility criterion.
From this perspective, the effectiveness of a treatment can and
should be measured not only by quantitative factors, such as the odds
or duration of relief, but also by the magnitude of the benefit con-
ferred. For example, the value to Barney Clark of Jarvik's artificial
heart would be greatly exaggerated if his quality of life were ignored.
Surely, a life-sustaining treatment that offers a month of pleasurable
life is preferable to one that promises months of debilitating side
effects.
The strongest evidence of this assumption is provided by the daily
decisions of patients and their families to discontinue life-sustaining
care. And if some life-extending care is reasonably perceived as con-
trary to patient interests, then surely some other life-extending treat-
ments are nonbeneficial or barely beneficial. These treatments should
receive lower priority than treatments that offer a better prognosis.
Plausible candidates for the rationing axe might, therefore, include di-
alysis requests for vegetative patients,24 9 respirators for anencephalic
babies like Baby K,25 0 or organ transplants for severely demented pa-
tients with multiple organ failure. If health care resources must be
allocated to these treatments, then our money, organs, and other
health care resources will be poorly used. At least at the extremes,
there ought to be limits on the demands that patients and families can
make to use collective resources. In this respect, genuine efforts to
allocate health resources efficiently provide an even stronger justifica-
tion for the denial of "pointless" or "nonbeneficial" care than con-
cerns about patient welfare. 251
CENER REP., May-June 1991, at Supp. 11; Hadom, supra note 35, at 1455; Paul T. Menzel,
Oregon's Denial: Disabilities and Quality of Life, HAsrINos CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21;
see also Alexander M. Capron, Oregon's Disability: Principles or Politics?, HAsTiNGs CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 18, 20 (suggesting that ranking on the basis of disability is permitted,
but that exclusions based on disability are not).
248 For an elaboration of this point, see Peters, supra note 106, at 517-33.
249 Judith W. Ross, The Puzzle of the Permanently Unconscious, HAsarNGs CENTER REP.,
May-June 1992, at 2, 3.
250 Her care reportedly cost $246,000 between her birth on Oct. 13, 1992, and mid-June of
1993 for hospital care alone. She resided in a nursing home when not hospitalized. Jane B.
Quinn, Taking Back Health Care, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 36. Ellen Wright Clayton
thoughtfully asks what we would do if Baby K had needed a heart transplant or dialysis. See
Ellen W. Clayton, Breathing for Baby K, ASLME BunrsNos, No. 10, Summer 1994 at 1, 2.
Baby K died in the spring of 1996 despite aggressive care.
251 See supra text following note 207.
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How are these two views to be reconciled? Given the serious
concerns raised when quality of life is used to make end-of-life ration-
ing decisions and the absence of either public consensus or congres-
sional guidance, courts should not permit unrestricted consideration
of patient quality of life. At the same time, the reasonability of argu-
ments for taking quality of life into account in the most extreme cases
suggests the need for some limited freedom to take quality of life into
account. In those cases in which the benefits to be derived from treat-
ment are most doubtful and the costs to be saved are substantial, the
presumption that all life has equal value should yield to the goal of
maximizing the health care benefits derived from finite resources. So
limited, the use of qualitative rationing criteria can be squared with
the statutory requirements that exclusionary eligibility criteria be es-
sential and that reasonable accommodations be offered. In addition,
the freedom to take quality of life into account in these limitied cir-
cumstances should be limited to those physicians with a legitimate
role as rationers, a subject considered further below,252 and to opting
out of treatment, rather than unilaterally withholding it.25 3
A number of different approaches could be used to define the
most defensible cases for taking quality of life into account. Haavi
Morreim, for example, has proposed a relatively narrow definition.
She recommends adoption of the limits imposed by the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 on treatment decisions for newborns.25 4 Under
those rules, life support can only be withheld when a patient is chroni-
cally and irreversibly comatose, the treatment would be futile in terms
of survival, or treatment would be virtually futile and inhumane.255
A slightly different definition would permit actors with legitimate
rationing responsibility25 6 to opt out of all treatments which meet a
test that I have previously suggested for rationing by health benefits
plans. Under that limit, quality-of-life rationing would be permitted
only when the patient's quality of life is so poor that doubt exists
about the patient's interest in life-sustaining care, the patient's cogni-
tive function is so severely impaired that the conscious benefits of liv-
ing are unlikely to be significant, and finally, the anticipated costs of
life-extending care are extraordinary. 25 7 Applying this standard,
courts and juries could conclude that refusal to provide dialysis to a
252 See infra text accompanying notes 262-71.
253 Patients would, therefore, be free to fund the disputed care with their own resources, to
appeal the rationing decision to their insurer, to seek other sources of financing, or to seek
gratuitous services.
254 Morreim, supra note 224, at 924-25.
255 Id.
256 The extent to which physicians have a role as rationers is considered in subpart V.B.
257 Peters, supra note 106, at 541.
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comatose patient is defensible, but that denying a quadriplegic or re-
tarded patient access to organ transplantation is not.
Significantly, each of these approaches shares one important simi-
larity. Each would allow the rationing of life-sustaining care only
when the existence of any net benefit to the patient is seriously in
doubt.258 Under these circumstances, the case for allowing quality-of-
life judgments does not depend exclusively on the arguments in favor
of efficiency. Instead, it overlaps and reinforces the arguments for
permitting providers to opt out of treatments that they doubt will ad-
vance patient welfare.
As an alternative to these two relatively narrow exceptions to the
prohibition on quality-of-life judgments, courts could conceivably en-
dorse a more general and somewhat more permissive exception for all
potentially life-sustaining treatments that providers genuinely and rea-
sonably believe will confer no benefit upon the patient. As a matter
of statutory interpretation, this more general restriction may be easier
to defend as an interpretation of the existing antidiscrimination stat-
utes than the approaches described above, which probably require
congressional action.
Each of these approaches has its own advantages. Mimicking the
Child Abuse Amendments would offer greater specificity and there-
fore more guidance to physicians, families, and courts than a rule
which permits rationers to opt out of care they reasonably and genu-
inely believe to be non-beneficial. It would also coordinate the re-
quirements imposed by the antidiscrimination statutes with those of
the federal child abuse statute. On the other hand, the price of that
specificity is a narrowness that focuses principally on easily identified
categories of patients such as those who will die soon and those in a
vegetative state. Such an approach inescapably excludes many cases
in which providers may reasonably believe that aggressive life-support
would be nonbeneficial.
A more general standard does, however, accentuate one risk.
Physicians might claim that a treatment is non-beneficial when their
true conviction is that the treatment is not worth the cost. The experi-
ence of the British with their National Health system suggests that
physicians often convert even obvious rationing criteria, such as arbi-
trary age limits, into decisions about medical appropriateness. 25 9
Hence, a physician's reluctance to treat Baby K or Baby Rena may be
258 See eg., Elhauge, supra note 247, at 1540 (arguing that risk-adjusted premiums ought not
reflect costs of "heroic measures that do no more than postpone death in an unconscious, pain-
ful, or temporary state near the end of life"); Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?,
N.Y. Rav. BoOKs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20, 23 (concluding that individuals would not desire insur-
ance coverage for vegetative or demented states or care for the elderly that would extend life
only a few months).
259 Levinsky, supra note 147, at 797.
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more likely to be experienced by the physician as a decision based on
patient welfare than one based entirely or even principally on cost-
effectiveness.
Several factors could help to reduce this risk. First, the burden
placed on physicians to prove the genuineness and reasonableness of
their beliefs that the treatment is nonbeneficial should serve as a bar-
rier against treatment decisions that are unduly based on inappropri-
ate quality of life judgments.260 Second, the physician's obligation to
provide patients and their families with notice and an opportunity to
transfer to another physician will temper the dangers of overzealous
rationing by subjecting provider decisions to public scrutiny.261
Nevertheless, courts will understandably be reluctant to permit
rationing decisions based on quality of life without clearer statutory
authority. In addition to their concerns about administrability, they
may reasonably conclude that any exceptions to the general prohibi-
tion on rationing decision based on quality-of-life judgments should
be products of public and democratic processes. As a result, they are
likely to wait for congressional guidance before permitting quality of
life to be considered in those extreme cases in which the benefits are
most dubious and the costs are substantive.
B. Physician Standing to Ration
Even if quality of life is a permissible rationing criterion, an indi-
vidual physician should not be permitted to act on her own beliefs
about wasteful care unless she occupies a legitimate role as rationer.
If she does, however, she need not defer to patient views about an
acceptable quality of life.
1. The Physician's Role as Rationer. -Absent responsibility to
ration, health care providers cannot demonstrate that disability-based
allocation decisions are necessary or essential to their practice.262 The
260 Especially skeptical courts could even impose a clear and convincing evidence standard.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 210-20. In addition, reasonable accommodations
might include a right to appeal an adverse decision to others in the health insurance plan to
assure fairness and consistency across the plan. Courts might even require that physicians
demonstrate that an obligation to render treatments like the one in dispute would have a signifi-
cant impact on patient access to more effective care or on health insurance premiums and thus
would constitute an undue burden on the provider or plan. See Orentlicher, supra note 50, at 72
(suggesting that reasonable accommodations preclude disability-based decisions in health care
unless the treatment would be very expensive and would not be minimally beneficial); see also
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 50.
262 In addition, defensible rationing decisions will often require reliable data about the cost-
effectiveness of the disputed treatment and an understanding of either the cost-effectiveness
threshold established by available resources or the cost-effectiveness of other competing margin-
ally effective treatments. But if, as proposed here, quality-of-life criteria can only be used to
determine whether the treatment confers any benefit at all, the data problem is obviated consid-
erably. Instead, the provider must show that his beliefs about minimal quality of life are genuine
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wisdom of assigning rationing responsibilities to treating physicians is
a complex, controversial, and evolving topic that cannot be thoroughly
revisited here.26 3 But a few preliminary observations will suggest the
contours of the dispute as it relates to the antidiscrimination laws.
Physicians will most readily establish that it is "necessary" for them to
make rationing decisions under the following circumstances: (1) when
they have been expressly delegated the task of apportioning scarce
resources by the benefits plans whose resources must be allocated, (2)
and fall with the range of reasonable disagreement. Survey or research data that examine dis-
abled patients' perceptions about their quality of life would be relevant in determining whether
the physician's beliefs are reasonable. See Peters, supra note 106, at nn.200-02.
263 As a general normative matter, physician rationing raises fundamental questions about the
nature of the physician-patient relationship and the extent to which it can or should survive the
"dual agency" that arises when physicians act as rationers. See, eg., Marcia Angell, The Doctor
as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY INsT. ETmIcs J. 279 (1993); Paul T. Menzel, Double Agency and
the Ethics of Rationing Health Care" A Response to Marcia Angell, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
287 (1993). See also COUNCIL ON ErHcAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 332, 334 (1995) (rejecting bedside rationing, but then
fudging by limiting the objection to cost-benefit judgments that "go beyond" those made "as
part of their normal professional responsibilities"); Hall, supra note 4. The conflict is especially
acute when physicians are given financial incentives to contain costs by reducing utilization. See
MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFICrS OF INTEREST
(1993); Hall, supra note 4, at 758-76.
Yet, clinicians can individualize their allocation decision to the circumstances of individual
patients far better than insurers can. As a result, they will have to play an important role in the
rational allocation of health resources. See, e.g., Susan D. Goold & Howard Brody, Rationing
Decisions in Managed Care Settings: An Ethical Analysis, in HEALTH CARE CRIsis? TmE SEARCH
FOR ANswERs 135, 139 (Robert I. Misbin et al. eds., 1995); Hall, supra note 4, at 701-02; Miles,
supra note 16, at 313; David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians to Do Less: Financial Incentives to
Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155 (1996). Indeed, physicians have always played a steward-
ship role to some extent. They routinely make unarticulated cost-benefit decisions when making
determinations such as whether to order diagnostic tests, preventive screenings, referral to spe-
cialists, or hospitalization. If every treatment of conceivable benefit were ordered, as Mark Hall
notes, we would all have whole body MRI scans regularly. Hall, supra note 4, at 723. Tort law
recognizes this stewardship role by delegating determination of the standard of care to medical
custom. KEETON ET AL, supra note 206, § 32, at 189 & nn.51-57. In fact, a few states have
recently enacted legislation explicitly protecting physicians from liability for withholding "ethi-
cally inappropriate" or "medically ineffective" care. See supra note 215. On the other hand,
there is much less reason to believe that an unstated consensus in favor of physician rationing in
general supports physician decisions about a minimally adequate quality of life in particular.
Ultimately, a marriage between payors and providers may yield the most ideal rationing
process. Insurers and government assistance plans not only have a better sense of current
budget constraints than clinicians, but they may also be better positioned to consider customer
or taxpayer preferences about the role that bedside rationing should play vis-h-vis other methods
of controlling costs, including categorical exclusions of some kinds of coverage (such as dental,
mental, or infertility care) and random allocations (such as first-come-first-served). They may
also be better situated than practitioners to screen the many medical specialties in search of the
most wasteful practices and to impose a relatively uniform threshold of cost-effectiveness across
diverse areas of practice. In the long term, the respective strength of payors and providers could
be combined. Clinicians could be given discretion to individualize within parameters set by pu-
bic policy, government agencies, and organizations with access to defensible comparative data
and public input.
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when they themselves are the stakeholders, or (3) when they have the
responsibility of allocating a naturally scarce commodity such as trans-
plantable organs. By contrast, the physician's claim of standing is
much weaker when the patient or her insurers are willing to pay for an
available treatment and the physician, nonetheless, insists that the
treatment is wasteful.
Under some circumstances, health plans will expressly delegate to
physicians the task of bedside rationing. This is most likely to occur in
a managed care setting where physicians may be expected to imple-
ment either specific guidelines or more general efficiency goals. When
this occurs, the physician shares the standing of the benefits plan to
use whatever eligibility criteria the plan is legally permitted to employ,
even if the patient disagrees.264 Even traditional indemnity insurers
delegate some of their coverage decisions to physicians when they
limit their reimbursement obligations to "medically necessary" or
"medically appropriate" care. Likewise, physicians responsible for
the allocation of a naturally occurring shortage, such as transplantable
organs or intensive care beds, should have standing to take effective-
ness into account in legally permissible ways. For these groups of phy-
sicians, the difficult question is whether courts should insist that any
delegation of decision-making authority specifically include authority
to consider quality of life. Without it, courts may doubt that quality-
of-life judgments are essential to the clinician's rationing
responsibilities.
In other instances, physicians will be stakeholders themselves.
Physicians paid by capitation, for example, must ration their own time
and resources among their pool of patients;265 so, too, must clinicians
who provide unreimbursed care for indigent patients. Under those
circumstances, a physician seeking to maximize the health of her pa-
tient pool will take into account the probable effectiveness of treat-
ment. She should be permitted to take disability into account to the
extent otherwise permitted by the antidiscrimination laws.
The standing of physicians to make rationing decisions is far more
tenuous when they are not allocating their own assets and have not
been assigned such a role by the groups whose assets are being allo-
cated. Imagine; for example, that the patient's insurer is willing to
fund the requested life-sustaining care, as apparently occurred in the
cases of Helga Wanglie and Baby K.266 In such cases, the plan has
264 For a discussion of the limits that the disability rights law impose on health benefits plans,
see Crossley, supra note 8, Orentlicher, supra note 50, and Peters, supra note 106.
265 See Crossley, supra note 8, at 245-48 (noting that the captivated provider has a stronger
case for arguing that a futility policy is necessary). As a stakeholder, providers would also have a
plausible claim to qualify for the statutory provision which explicitly authorizes consideration of
underwriting risks. 42 U.S.C § 12201(c)(2) (1994).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25, 94-102.
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already chosen the criteria it will employ to allocate its available re-
sources and has determined that the disputed care meets those crite-
ria. Under these circumstances, the physician's effort to trump the
insurer's decision does not seem "essential" to his practice of
medicine.267 In this setting, physicians who refuse to offer care that
they perceive to be wasteful are actually attempting to conserve the
resources of insurance plans that do not agree that their resources are
being spent inappropriately. This is a far less powerful claim of con-
science than providers can assert when they are asked to provide care
that they genuinely and reasonably believe to be harmful.
Although physicians can still make plausible arguments for free-
dom to opt out, these arguments are not likely to be sufficient. For
example, an individual physician can argue that she is an autonomous
agent with her own conscience and sense of social responsibility.268
She can contend that she has a responsibility directly to other patients
or subscribers to use her knowledge to identify especially cost-ineffec-
tive care on their behalf. She may, in some instances, be acting con-
sistently with customs of her peers and, thus, drawing on the
accumulated experience of her profession. If not, she may feel an ob-
ligation to help establish new and more responsible medical customs.
From her perspective, she should be permitted to opt out of treat-
ments that she reasonably and genuinely believes would not benefit
her patient, even if her patient disagrees. However, courts are un-
likely to accept these arguments in favor of physician autonomy.
Under the antidiscrimination laws, a patient's disability cannot be
considered unfavorably unless doing so is essential to achieving a pro-
gram's objectives. When a health benefits plan is willing or contractu-
ally obliged to pay for a requested treatment and the patient believes
it would be beneficial, the individual physician's rationing input is not
essential.
267 Accord Crossley, supra note 8, at 245. Although there is neither legislative history nor
caselaw applying this requirement to the identity of the rationer, it seems reasonable to postulate
that a physician seeking to meet that burden will have to demonstrate not merely that rationing
would advance a broad societal interest in maximizing the impact of health dollars, but further
that bedside rationing by physicians of ineffective care is essential either to their role as treating
physicians or to some other specific health care program of which they are an integral part.
This issue can also be couched as a failure to make reasonable modifications because elimi-
nation of disability-based decisions to ration under these circumstances arguably would not re-
quire a "fundamental" alteration of medical practice. See Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407-14 (1979) (interpreting Section 504); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)
(1994) (public services must make "reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practices"); 42
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994) (public accommodations must make reasonable modifica-
tions unless doing so would "fundamentally alter the nature of such services"); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7) (1994) (excluding from the reasonable accommodation requirement changes that
would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service").
268 See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
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2. Deference to Patient Wishes.-As discussed in Part IV, physi-
cians who are motivated exclusively by concerns about their patient's
well-being should ordinarily defer to the views of their patient regard-
ing an acceptable quality of life. But when the physician making a
determination of the patient's interests in further life-sustaining care is
motivated by concerns about efficient resource allocation, the argu-
ment for deference to patient preferences is much less compelling.
When rationing decisions are being made, deference to patient
wishes may not be warranted for two reasons. First, the disability
fights laws permit government and private health benefits plans to de-
termine the criteria by which they will allocate their available re-
sources as long as those criteria do not violate the disability rights
laws. As discussed earlier in this Part, a provider's refusal to fund
treatments that are reasonably characterized as non-beneficial com-
ports with those laws. Must a plan, nevertheless, defer to patients who
disagree? Not if the plan is motivated by concerns about efficient re-
source use in addition to doubts about patient well-being. If protect-
ing patient welfare were the only objective, deference to the patient's
values would be appropriate. If, however, the plan is attempting to
distribute pooled assets in a way that maximizes the benefits achieved,
patients have a less powerful claim that their own subjective evalua-
tion of benefits should trump those of the plan and its subscribers.
Although patients should be free to use their own assets to purchase
the treatments they desire, there are limits on the obligation of health
care plans, their subscribers, and clinicians to fund every treatment
that patients or their families desire. Those plans may reasonably de-
cide not to fund life-sustaining treatments that their members do not
believe are beneficial, even if individual subscribers disagree.
Second, patients who desire unlimited life-extending care have a
patent conflict of interest. Patients and their families have an obvious
incentive to disregard relative cost and effectiveness in favor of un-
restricted access to resources, as evidenced by the families who have
sought continued treatment for brain dead patients269 and dialysis for
vegetative patients.270
Does this mean that physicians can ignore a patient's views about
the value of additional life as long as they are genuinely motivated by
concerns about wise resource use and their conclusions are reason-
able? Yes, but only if the treating physician has a legitimate role as a
rationer of health care resources and applies the rationing criteria
even-handedly. 271
269 See Miles, supra note 22, at 512-19.
270 Ross, supra note 249, at 2, 3.
271 Crossley, supra note 8, at 246 n285 (stating that inconsistent application of effectiveness
criteria may indicate bias).
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To summarize, physicians who disagree with a patient's own as-
sessment of the value of life-sustaining care will need to establish their
standing to make rationing decisions before they may make rationing
decisions that take disability into account. Physicians who are stake-
holders or are assigned a rationing role by stakeholders may be able
to make this showing. In the context of bedside rationing of life-sus-
taining care, these physicians would, therefore, be permitted to con-
sider quality of life in those situations in which it is otherwise
permissible, even if the patient disagrees. But the standing of individ-
ual physicians to act on their own consciences is far more doubtful.
VI. CONCLUSION
Application of the federal disability rights laws to medical treat-
ment decisions is complex. On the one hand, a patient's disability will
often seem a relevant and proper consideration. On the other hand,
consideration of a patient's disability can put a disabled patient at a
disadvantage whenever the patient's disability reduces the effective-
ness of the requested treatment. Under these circumstances, the
courts face the unenviable task of determining when disability may
permissibly be taken into account.
This Article has examined this tension in the context of bedside
futility judgments about life-sustaining care. It has focused exclusively
on the use of quality-of-life judgments to make these treatment deci-
sions. Although quantitative measures of treatment effectiveness,
such as the odds of success, also raise serious disability rights issues,
quality-of-life judgments are especially controversial because they im-
plicitly assume that the value of life is reduced when the patient has a
severe disability.
In order to determine when physician judgments about patient
quality of life violate the disability rights laws, courts must first iden-
tify the medical treatment decisions to which the federal disability
rights laws apply. They should extend the reach of these laws to all
medical treatment decisions regardless of whether the treatment in
question is related to the patient's disability. Although the distinction
between related and unrelated conditions responds to legitimate judi-
cial concerns about the difficulty of establishing unequal treatment, it
would exclude a whole class of patients from redress. In addition, it
presents line-drawing problems of its own. Ultimately, the arbitrari-
ness of the distinction as a normative matter justifies acceptance of the
practical difficulties which accompany its rejection.
Once the reach of the antidiscrimination laws has been decided,
the courts will have to determine the circumstances in which a pa-
tient's disability may permissibly be taken into account. A patient's
disability is arguably relevant whenever it is likely to influence the
effectiveness of the treatment and, thus, the patient's ability to benefit
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from it. From this perspective, the value of life-sustaining care cannot
be determined without considering the quality of life that the treat-
ment offers. Patients and their families confirm this judgment on a
daily basis through their decisions to decline life-sustaining care. To
critics of quality-of-life judgments, however, all life is equally valuable
regardless of disability or quality of life. Quality-of-life judgments
raise the disturbing specter of decisions that would, for example, ex-
clude quadriplegic or retarded patients from the receipt of organ
transplants or other life-prolonging care because the treatment would
do more good if offered to others. From this perspective, quality-of-
life judgments threaten the principle of equal worth and violate the
antidiscrimination laws.
Congress has given no guidance on how the disability rights laws
should apply to cases posing this conflict in fundamental values. As a
result, the courts will have to decide whether quality-of-life judgments
are among the "necessary" or "essential" criteria that may be em-
ployed when making a decision about life-sustaining care. Because
reasonable people disagree about the relevance of quality of life to
end-of-life treatment decisions and because Congress has given no
guidance on the issue, the courts ought not interpret the antidis-
crimination laws to prohibit all quality-of-life judgments. A complete
prohibition would preclude not just physicians, but also courts, guardi-
ans, and others governed by the disability rights laws from taking
quality of life into account when making or regulating treatment deci-
sions. In addition, a complete prohibition would ignore the con-
sciences of physicians who genuinely and reasonably feel that a
treatment requested by the patient's family would be cruel. Further-
more, a prohibition would have crucial implications for the allocation
of health care resources. Providers and insurers would be barred from
taking quality of life into account when determining, for example,
whether to fund organ transplants or dialysis for patients in a vegeta-
tive state.
Instead, a more subtle reconciliation of the competing interests of
patients, families, and physicians should be crafted. In limited circum-
stances, providers can make a legally and ethically powerful claim for
freedom to take the quality of life of their patients into account.
When they can, courts ought to permit them to opt out of requested
treatments, but oblige them to cooperate in transfer of the patient to
another provider. In this way, the conscience of the provider can be
accommodated without sacrificing the family's opportunity to find a
provider who shares their values.
Physicians should be permitted to opt out of requested life-sus-
taining care when they genuinely and reasonably believe that a treat-
ment requested by the patient's family would be harmful to the
patient. They will be able to meet this test of reasonableness only
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when their conclusions about patient welfare fall within the range of
reasonable disagreement and there is no proof of invidious bias or
factual error. In addition, a request to opt out of purportedly cruel
treatment is not persuasive when the patient has personally requested
the disputed treatment.
Physicians may also wish to opt out of life-sustaining care because
they believe it to be an unwise use of scarce health care resources.
Once again, quality of life will seem a relevant consideration to some
and improper to others. However, rationing decisions such as these
would greatly expand the circumstances in which disabled patients
could be disfavored by consideration of quality of life. In addition,
there is less societal consensus about the propriety of using quality of
life to make rationing decisions than there is supporting consideration
of quality of life when deciding whether life-sustaining care would be
best for the patient. Furthermore, the financial savings that would ac-
crue are uncertain. As a result, quality-of-life judgments should not
be permitted except in the most extreme cases, i.e., those instances
where the value of treatment to the patient is most dubious and the
costs are significant. Dialysis treatments for a vegetative patient
might qualify for such an exception. Courts could conceivably craft
this exception to the general prohibition on quality-of-life judgments
as a matter of statutory interpretation, but are more likely to await
guidance from Congress.
When the physician's request to opt out of requested care ap-
pears to be based on concerns about waste, rather then cruelty, the
physician's role as rationer will also need to be examined. The pro-
priety of that role is most likely to be established when the physicians
are rationing their own resources or when the stakeholder has ex-
pressly delegated rationing authority to her. When the physicians act
on their own conscience, however, their demand for freedom of con-
science is much less powerful than it is when they seek to opt out of a
treatment that they genuinely and reasonably believe to be cruel.
These are the restrictions that the disability rights laws ought to
place on futility judgments about life-sustaining care. Each can be
squared with the existing federal statutes, although some will require
novel interpretations of the statutory text. If, however, courts are un-
willing to interpret the statutory requirements in this fashion or if they
feel that the tests proposed here are too difficult to administer, then
specific statutory modifications to strike a similar balance would be
preferable to either a blanket prohibition on quality-of-life judgments
or unfettered discretion to take disability-impaired quality of life into
account.
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